Exploitation requires creating such a link or FIFO inside the user's storage directory. pgAdmin offers no way to do so, and the per-user storage directories belong to the pgAdmin account, so this requires write access to the storage backend as a different operating-system user, for example a shared or network-mounted storage directory, and winning the race.
The fix opens each file by walking down from the storage directory one component at a time with O_NOFOLLOW, accepting only a regular file with one link, and passes the utilities the open descriptor (/dev/fd/N) on Linux. Error messages no longer include the server path.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19.
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
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Fri, 30 Oct 2026 22:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Pgadmin
Pgadmin pgadmin 4 |
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| Vendors & Products |
Pgadmin
Pgadmin pgadmin 4 |
Fri, 30 Oct 2026 20:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In server mode pgAdmin 4 validates a path a user gives for a file in their storage directory with check_access_permission() and then opened it by name. Several places opened it with a plain open() or handed the path to a utility that opened it later: the servers.json export and import and the import file listing, and the files given to pg_dump, pg_dumpall, pg_restore and psql by Backup, Restore and Import/Export Data. A symbolic link swapped in at the file or at any parent directory between the check and the open redirected the operation outside the storage directory, so a file could be written, overwritten or read, or loaded into a table, as the operating-system account running pgAdmin. A hard link to an outside file, which O_NOFOLLOW does not detect, and a FIFO, which could hang a request, had the same effect. CVE-2026-86861 fixed this for the File Manager's save_file; these were the remaining paths. Exploitation requires creating such a link or FIFO inside the user's storage directory. pgAdmin offers no way to do so, and the per-user storage directories belong to the pgAdmin account, so this requires write access to the storage backend as a different operating-system user, for example a shared or network-mounted storage directory, and winning the race. The fix opens each file by walking down from the storage directory one component at a time with O_NOFOLLOW, accepting only a regular file with one link, and passes the utilities the open descriptor (/dev/fd/N) on Linux. Error messages no longer include the server path. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19. | |
| Title | pgAdmin 4: Files opened in a storage directory follow a symbolic link, hard link or FIFO planted after the containment check | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-367 CWE-59 |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: PostgreSQL
Published:
Updated: 2026-10-30T19:55:18.713Z
Reserved: 2026-10-25T16:26:16.420Z
Link: CVE-2026-116250
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-10-30T20:17:05.170
Modified: 2026-10-30T20:17:05.170
Link: CVE-2026-116250
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-10-30T22:00:15Z