Description
Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting') vulnerability in hackney_http_connect in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a proxy_auth_fun callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11 calls the caller's proxy_auth_fun with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the Proxy-Authorization line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy.

The value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy's challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes.

This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0.
Published: 2026-10-26
Score: 2.1 Low
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.

Remediation

Vendor Workaround

Check the value your proxy_auth_fun is about to return for CR, LF and NUL bytes and return {error, Reason} instead when one is present. The callback runs in the application, so the check can be made there.

Tracking

Sign in to view the affected projects.

Advisories

No advisories yet.

History

Mon, 26 Oct 2026 16:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Mon, 26 Oct 2026 14:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting') vulnerability in hackney_http_connect in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a proxy_auth_fun callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11 calls the caller's proxy_auth_fun with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the Proxy-Authorization line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy. The value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy's challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes. This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0.
Title CRLF injection in Proxy-Authorization header built from proxy_auth_fun in hackney
First Time appeared Benoitc
Benoitc hackney
Weaknesses CWE-113
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Benoitc
Benoitc hackney
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 2.1, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N'}


cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: EEF

Published:

Updated: 2026-10-26T15:35:50.632Z

Reserved: 2026-10-26T10:15:01.166Z

Link: CVE-2026-112880

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-10-26T15:32:18.053Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-10-26T14:16:28.440

Modified: 2026-10-26T16:17:14.260

Link: CVE-2026-112880

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-10-26T16:00:18Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-113

    Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting')