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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-97204 | 1 Gitea | 1 Gitea | 2026-10-19 | 3.1 Low |
| Deleting a label compared the ID of the repository in the request against the organization ID of organization labels, and the two ID sequences overlap. A user with write access to the issues of a repository could therefore delete the labels of an organization that has the same numeric ID as that repository. Labels are now deleted only within their own repository or organization. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68290 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rds: tcp: unregister sysctl before tearing down listen socket rds_tcp_exit_net() frees the per-netns RDS TCP listen socket via rds_tcp_kill_sock() before unregistering the per-netns sysctl table. Since rds_tcp_skbuf_handler() derives the netns from rtn->rds_tcp_listen_sock->sk, a concurrent sysctl write can race with netns teardown and dereference the freed socket/sk. KASAN reports the race as: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rds_tcp_skbuf_handler+0x2aa/0x2e0 rds_tcp_skbuf_handler net/rds/tcp.c:721 proc_sys_call_handler fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c vfs_write fs/read_write.c __x64_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c Fix this by unregistering the RDS TCP sysctl table before calling rds_tcp_kill_sock(). unregister_net_sysctl_table() prevents new sysctl handlers from starting and waits for in-flight handlers to finish, so the listen socket can then be released safely. The fix was tested against the linked reproducer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68284 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: Fix cork use-after-free in tcp_bpf_sendmsg() tcp_bpf_sendmsg() keeps msg_tx across sk_stream_wait_memory(), which drops and reacquires the socket lock. Its error path tries to decide whether msg_tx names the local temporary message by comparing it with the current value of psock->cork. This comparison is unsafe when two threads send on the same socket: Thread A Thread B msg_tx = psock->cork sk_msg_alloc() fails sk_stream_wait_memory() releases the socket lock acquires the socket lock completes the cork psock->cork = NULL frees the cork reacquires the socket lock msg_tx != psock->cork sk_msg_free(msg_tx) The stale cork is therefore mistaken for the local temporary message and freed again. KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sk_msg_free+0x49/0x50 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810c908800 by task poc/90 Call Trace: sk_msg_free+0x49/0x50 tcp_bpf_sendmsg+0x14f5/0x1cc0 __sys_sendto+0x32c/0x3a0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdb/0x1b0 Allocated by task 89: __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 tcp_bpf_sendmsg+0x16b3/0x1cc0 Freed by task 91: __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70 kfree+0x131/0x3c0 tcp_bpf_sendmsg+0xec3/0x1cc0 msg_tx can only name the stack-local tmp or the shared cork. Check for tmp directly so a changed psock->cork cannot turn a shared message into an apparent local one. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68266 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: Hold a dma-buf reference for imported BOs An imported dma-buf BO is created as a ttm_bo_type_sg BO whose reservation object is the exporter's dma_buf->resv. The importer, however, only takes a dma-buf reference after a successful dma_buf_dynamic_attach(). Until then nothing keeps the exporter alive, so if the exporter is freed while the BO still references its resv, a later access to that resv is a use-after-free: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b9c Workqueue: ttm ttm_bo_delayed_delete [ttm] RIP: 0010:mutex_can_spin_on_owner+0x3f/0xc0 This can be reached on two paths: - dma_buf_dynamic_attach() fails, or - ttm_bo_init_reserved() fails during BO creation. In both cases the BO already has bo->base.resv pointing at the exporter resv, and sg BOs are always torn down via ttm_bo_delayed_delete(), which locks bo->base.resv asynchronously - potentially after the exporter has been freed. Take the dma-buf reference in xe_bo_init_locked(), before ttm_bo_init_reserved(), so it also covers a creation failure there, and release it in xe_ttm_bo_destroy(). The reference is held for the whole BO lifetime, keeping the shared resv alive on every path. v2: - Reworked the fix to avoid creating the imported sg BO before dma_buf_dynamic_attach() succeeds. - Attach with importer_priv == NULL and make invalidate_mappings ignore incomplete imports. v3: - Dropped the xe-side reordering approach since importer_priv must be valid when dma_buf_dynamic_attach() publishes the attachment. - Per Christian's suggestion on the v1 thread, keyed the check on import_attach rather than removing the sg guard entirely. - Fixes both xe and amdgpu in a single TTM patch. v4: - Moved import_attach check to after dma_resv_copy_fences() so fences are copied before returning for successful imports (Thomas). - Removed exporter-alive claim from commit message (Thomas). v5: - Add drm/xe patch to keep imported sg BOs off the LRU before attach succeeds; the TTM fix alone is not sufficient for xe if the BO is already LRU-visible. (Thomas) v4 patch: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/736663/?series=169129&rev=2 - Patch 1 (drm/ttm) carries Christian's Reviewed-by from v4. v6: - Reworked the fix based on Thomas' suggestion. Instead of the TTM resv individualization (v1-v5) plus the xe off-LRU/placement handling (v5), just hold a dma-buf reference for the imported BO lifetime so the shared resv can never be freed while the BO still references it. Single xe patch, no TTM change. (Thomas) - Take the reference in xe_bo_init_locked() before ttm_bo_init_reserved() so a TTM creation failure is covered too (Thomas). - Dropped the v5 series (drm/ttm + drm/xe off-LRU); the off-LRU approach also regressed in CI BAT via ttm_bo_pipeline_gutting() creating a ghost BO that outlived the exporter. Link to v5: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/169984/ v7: - Move changelog above --- so it stays in the commit message. - Reorder changelog entries oldest-to-newest. (Thomas) (cherry picked from commit 3516f3fae6be35642f8f06f8a218da6425c0306a) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68245 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: fix lifetime issue of amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_pasid() The vm pointer returned from amdgpu_vm_get_vm_from_pasid() is only valid while the lock is still being held. Once xa_unlock_irqrestore is called and returned, the pointer is no longer under lock and is subject to modification. Since, the caller still dereferences vm->task_info in amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_vm() after the lock is removed, this causes a use after unlock problem. Remove the lifetime issue present in amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_pasid() through removing the amdgpu_vm_get_vm_from_pasid() function from amdgpu_vm.c and making the relevant code inline to hold the lock while it is still in use. (cherry picked from commit 9d01579f3f868b333acc901815972685989092c7) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68202 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: seq: close a re-opened queue timer in the destructor queue_delete() closes the queue timer, then frees it. snd_seq_timer_close() clears q->timer->timeri. snd_use_lock_sync() then drains borrowers, and snd_seq_timer_delete() frees q->timer. A borrower can re-open the timer inside that window. A SET_QUEUE_CLIENT that took a queueptr() use_lock reference before the queue was unlinked runs snd_seq_timer_open() after the close. Open refuses re-open only while timeri is set, and the close just cleared it, so it re-opens timeri. snd_seq_timer_delete() does not close that instance. Its snd_seq_timer_stop() is a no-op, because running was cleared first. So it frees q->timer with the instance still live. The queue is freed next. The instance stays on the global timer with callback_data pointing at the freed queue. A non-owner START on the unlocked queue arms it. The next tick derefs the freed queue in snd_seq_timer_interrupt(). Reachable by an unprivileged user with access to /dev/snd/seq. No CAP and no queue ownership required. Close any lingering instance in the destructor. There, ->timeri can no longer change: the queue is unlinked and all use_lock borrowers have drained, so no snd_seq_queue_use() can re-open it. Close it before clearing q->timer. snd_timer_close() waits for any in-flight snd_seq_timer_interrupt() to finish, and that callback still reads q->timer (via snd_seq_check_queue()), so q->timer must stay valid until it drains. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68201 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: timer: drain a slave's callback before its master detaches it snd_timer_close_locked() drains the closing instance's own in-flight callback (IFLG_CALLBACK) before freeing it, but not its slaves'. When a master instance is closed, remove_slave_links() clears each slave's ->timer; the slave's own close then reads timer == NULL and takes the branch that skips the drain entirely (snd_timer_stop_slave() also no-ops on a NULL timer). So a slave whose callback is still running when the master is closed is freed underneath the live callback, leading to use-after-free. Drain the slaves too before remove_slave_links() severs them. snd_timer_stop() has already taken this instance off the active list, so no new slave callback can be queued. Take the slaves off the ack list so a pending one can't fire either, then wait for any that is already in flight. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68189 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sync: Protect UUID list traversal The hci_sync conversion moved class-of-device and EIR generation from an HCI request built under hdev->lock to asynchronous command sync work. The worker holds hdev->req_lock, but that lock does not serialize access to hdev->uuids against add_uuid() and remove_uuid(), which update the list under hdev->lock. The following interleaving can therefore occur: CPU0 (command sync work) CPU1 (management socket) fetch uuid from the list list_del(&uuid->list) kfree(uuid) read uuid->size KASAN reports the resulting use-after-free: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in eir_create+0xb8f/0xee0 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810dbd8620 by task kworker/u17:0/87 Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work Call Trace: eir_create+0xb8f/0xee0 hci_update_eir_sync+0x1c0/0x330 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x13c/0x290 process_one_work+0x63a/0x1070 worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10 Allocated by task 86: __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 add_uuid+0x18a/0x4b0 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x1033/0x1ea0 Freed by task 92: __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70 kfree+0x131/0x3c0 remove_uuid+0x25e/0x560 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x1033/0x1ea0 Hold hdev->lock while generating and committing the class-of-device and EIR snapshots. Release it before sending an HCI command, so controller waits do not happen under the device lock. This protects all UUID list walks in these paths and restores the serialization lost in the command sync conversion. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68179 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: nsm: only unlock nsm_dev on post-lock error paths nsm_dev_ioctl() jumps to the common out label even when the initial copy_from_user() fails before nsm->lock has been taken. The error path then blindly unlocks a mutex that was never acquired. This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually reviewed against the current tree. The grounded PoC kept the miscdevice ioctl entry and the pre-lock copy_from_user(&raw, argp, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)) failure path by issuing NSM_IOCTL_RAW with an invalid user pointer. That failure reaches the shared out label before mutex_lock(&nsm->lock). Lockdep reported: WARNING: bad unlock balance detected! exploit/193 is trying to release lock (&global_nsm.lock) at: nsm_dev_ioctl+0x5f/0xcf [vuln_msv] but there are no more locks to release! no locks held by exploit/193. Return immediately on the pre-lock copy_from_user() failure and keep the common unlock label for the post-lock paths only. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68162 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: avoid auth_enable sysctl UAF during netns teardown proc_sctp_do_auth() updates the SCTP control socket after changing net.sctp.auth_enable. The handler gets the per-net SCTP state from ctl->data, so an already opened sysctl file can still target a network namespace while that namespace is being torn down. SCTP previously registered its per-net sysctls from sctp_defaults_init(), while the control socket is created later from sctp_ctrlsock_init(). This exposed a window during initialization where auth_enable was writable before net->sctp.ctl_sock existed, and a teardown window where auth_enable stayed writable after inet_ctl_sock_destroy() had released the control socket. Move the per-net SCTP sysctl registration into sctp_ctrlsock_init() after sctp_ctl_sock_init() succeeds, and unregister the sysctl table before destroying the control socket in sctp_ctrlsock_exit(). If sysctl registration fails after the control socket was created, destroy the control socket in the same init path. Make sctp_sysctl_net_unregister() tolerate a missing header and clear the saved pointer so init-error and exit paths can safely share the unregister helper. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68156 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: refresh auth->authorizer_buf{,_len} after authorizer update ceph_x_create_authorizer() caches au->buf->vec.iov_base and au->buf->vec.iov_len in struct ceph_auth_handshake. These cached values are then used by the messenger connect code when sending the authorizer. ceph_x_update_authorizer() can rebuild the authorizer when a newer service ticket is available. If the rebuilt authorizer no longer fits in the existing buffer, ceph_x_build_authorizer() drops its reference to au->buf and allocates a new one. If this is the final reference, ceph_buffer_put() frees the old ceph_buffer and its vec.iov_base, but auth->authorizer_buf still points at that freed memory. A subsequent msgr1 reconnect can therefore queue the stale pointer and trigger a KASAN slab-use-after-free in _copy_from_iter() while tcp_sendmsg() copies the authorizer. Refresh auth->authorizer_buf and auth->authorizer_buf_len after a successful authorizer rebuild so the messenger sends the current buffer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68153 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: remove debugfs files before client teardown ceph_destroy_client() tears down the monitor client before removing the per-client debugfs files. A concurrent read of the monmap debugfs file can enter monmap_show() after ceph_monc_stop() has freed monc->monmap, triggering a use-after-free. Remove the debugfs files before stopping the OSD and monitor clients. debugfs_remove() drains active handlers and prevents new accesses, so the debugfs callbacks can no longer race the rest of client teardown. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68144 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: phonet: pep: fix use-after-free in pep_get_sb() pep_get_sb() doesn't consider that pskb_may_pull() might have relocated the skb data, and continue to access the older pointer, causing UAF. Reproduced under KASAN: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pep_get_sb+0x234/0x3b0 Read of size 1 at addr ff11000105510f50 by task repro/157 pep_get_sb+0x234/0x3b0 pipe_handler_do_rcv+0x5f7/0xa10 pep_do_rcv+0x203/0x410 __sk_receive_skb+0x471/0x4a0 phonet_rcv+0x5b3/0x6c0 __netif_receive_skb+0xcc/0x1d0 Refetch the header with skb_header_pointer() after pskb_may_pull(), so the possibly stale pointer is no longer dereferenced. There are better ways to solve this, but, this is the less instrusive one. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68142 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: geneve: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink A tunnel changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the sticky underlay netns geneve->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in geneve->net can rewrite a geneve device whose underlay lives in geneve->net. geneve_changelink() applies the new configuration against geneve->net: geneve_link_config() and the geneve_quiesce()/geneve_unquiesce() pair reopen the underlay sockets in that netns (geneve_sock_add() uses geneve->net), so the same reasoning as the tunnel changelink series applies here. Gate geneve_changelink() with rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(), at the top of the op before any attribute is parsed, matching ipgre_changelink() and the rest of the "require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink" series. Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68140 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/iucv: fix use-after-free of a severed iucv_path af_iucv queues not-yet-received message notifications on iucv->message_q, each holding a raw pointer to the connection's iucv_path. When the peer severs the connection, iucv_sever_path() frees that path with iucv_path_free() but leaves the notifications queued. A later recvmsg() drains message_q via iucv_process_message_q() and hands the stale path to message_receive() -- a use-after-free of the freed iucv_path. Drop the queued notifications when the path is severed; once the path is gone they can no longer be received. This also frees the notifications leaked when a socket is closed with messages still queued. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68127 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ila: reload IPv6 header after pskb_may_pull in checksum adjust ila_csum_adjust_transport() caches ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb) before calling pskb_may_pull(). On a non-linear skb whose transport header sits in a page fragment, pskb_may_pull() can call __pskb_pull_tail() / pskb_expand_head() and free the old skb head, leaving ip6h dangling; the following get_csum_diff(ip6h, p) then reads freed memory. ila_update_ipv6_locator() uses ip6h (and the iaddr derived from it) again after the csum-adjust call and additionally writes the new locator through that pointer. Impact: a remote IPv6 packet routed through a configured ILA csum-adjust-transport route or receive-side mapping triggers a slab-use-after-free in ila_update_ipv6_locator() (KASAN). The route or mapping requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to configure, but trigger packets are unauthenticated once it exists. Reload ip6h after each pskb_may_pull() in ila_csum_adjust_transport() before the csum-diff read. In ila_update_ipv6_locator() only the ILA_CSUM_ADJUST_TRANSPORT case pulls the skb, so reload ip6h and iaddr in that case alone before the destination-address write; the neutral-map modes never pull and keep their cached pointers. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68121 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pppoe: reload header pointer after dev_hard_header() pppoe_sendmsg() saves a pointer to the PPPoE header before calling dev_hard_header(). Device header callbacks are allowed to reallocate the skb head, invalidating pointers into it. This can happen when a send is blocked in copy_from_user() while the first non-Ethernet port is added to an empty team device. The team's delegated GRE header callback then expands the skb head. PPPoE subsequently writes six bytes through the stale pointer into the freed head. Reload the PPPoE header through the skb's network-header offset after device header creation. pskb_expand_head() updates that offset when it relocates the head. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68117 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: clear sock->sk on the failed-insert path in tipc_sk_create() When tipc_sk_create() fails to insert the new socket (tipc_sk_insert() returns non-zero), its error path frees the sk with sk_free() but leaves sock->sk pointing at the freed object: if (tipc_sk_insert(tsk)) { sk_free(sk); pr_warn("Socket create failed; port number exhausted\n"); return -EINVAL; } This is harmless for plain socket(): the syscall layer clears sock->ops before releasing, so tipc_release() is never called. It is not harmless on the accept() path. tipc_accept() creates the pre-allocated child socket with tipc_sk_create(net, new_sock, 0, kern); on failure it leaves new_sock->sk dangling and new_sock->ops non-NULL, and do_accept() then fput()s the new file, so __sock_release() -> tipc_release() runs lock_sock(new_sock->sk) on the freed sk -- a use-after-free write of the sk_lock spinlock. tipc_release() already guards this exact "failed accept() releases a pre-allocated child" case with "if (sk == NULL) return 0;", but the guard is bypassed because tipc_sk_create() left sock->sk non-NULL (dangling) rather than NULL. Clear sock->sk on the failed-insert path so the existing tipc_release() NULL check fires and the use-after-free is avoided. The tipc_sk_insert() failure is reached when the per-netns socket rhashtable hits its max_size (tsk_rht_params.max_size = 1048576, ~2M elements) -- i.e. once a netns holds ~2M TIPC sockets every insert returns -E2BIG. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_sock_nested (net/core/sock.c:3839) Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880047cdc38 by task init/1 lock_sock_nested (net/core/sock.c:3839) tipc_release (net/tipc/socket.c:638) __sock_release (net/socket.c:710) sock_close (net/socket.c:1501) __fput (fs/file_table.c:512) Allocated by task 1: sk_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2308) tipc_sk_create (net/tipc/socket.c:487) tipc_accept (net/tipc/socket.c:2744) do_accept (net/socket.c:2034) Freed by task 1: __sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2391) tipc_sk_create (net/tipc/socket.c:504) tipc_accept (net/tipc/socket.c:2744) do_accept (net/socket.c:2034) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68104 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: invoke pm_genpd_remove() before freeing genpd Call pm_genpd_remove() to unregister from global list prior to releasing acp_genpd memory, and clear the pointer after free. (cherry picked from commit cd8650d7a91ee8b768e202354672553faa5cc1f2) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68096 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: audit: fix recursive locking deadlock in audit_dupe_exe() A deadlock occurs in the audit subsystem when duplicating executable-related rules. When a file is moved (e.g., via do_renameat2()), the VFS layer locks the parent directory (I_MUTEX_PARENT), which synchronously triggers an fsnotify_move event. If an existing executable audit rule matches the file being moved, the audit subsystem catches this event and calls audit_dupe_exe() to duplicate the watch and update the rule. Then, audit_alloc_mark() would call kern_path_parent() to resolve the path, leading to a blind attempt to acquire the exact same I_MUTEX_PARENT lock already held by the task, resulting in the following recursive locking deadlock: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.12.0-55.27.1.el10_0.x86_64+debug #1 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- mv/5099 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888132845358 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __kern_path_locked+0x10a/0x2f0 but task is already holding lock: ffff888132846b58 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_two_directories+0x13f/0x2b0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1); lock(&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 6 locks held by mv/5099: #0: ffff888112a9c440 (sb_writers#13) at: do_renameat2+0x34c/0xbc0 #1: ffff888112a9c790 (&type->s_vfs_rename_key#3) at: do_renameat2+0x415/0xbc0 #2: ffff888132846b58 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1) at: lock_two_directories+0x13f/0x2b0 #3: ffff888132845358 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/5) at: lock_two_directories+0x175/0x2b0 #4: ffffffffb3a1fb10 (&fsnotify_mark_srcu) at: fsnotify+0x454/0x28a0 #5: ffffffffaf886230 (audit_filter_mutex) at: audit_update_watch+0x36/0x11e0 stack backtrace: Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0 print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xbd/0xca validate_chain+0x83a/0xf00 __lock_acquire+0xcac/0x1d20 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x360 down_write_nested+0x9f/0x230 __kern_path_locked+0x10a/0x2f0 kern_path_locked+0x26/0x40 audit_alloc_mark+0xfb/0x4f0 audit_dupe_exe+0x6c/0xe0 audit_dupe_rule+0x6c2/0xc00 audit_update_watch+0x4cc/0x11e0 audit_watch_handle_event+0x12c/0x1b0 send_to_group+0x5d0/0x8b0 fsnotify+0x615/0x28a0 fsnotify_move+0x1d8/0x630 vfs_rename+0xdcd/0x1df0 do_renameat2+0x9d4/0xbc0 __x64_sys_renameat+0x192/0x260 do_syscall_64+0x92/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f0491fe8c4e Code: 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 15 c1 e1 16 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 08 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 0a c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 15 89 RSP: 002b:00007ffc7210bf38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000108 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f0491fe8c4e RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 00007ffc7210e6c8 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 00005575eb2dae2a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005575eb2dae2a R13: 00007ffc7210e6c8 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 00000000ffffff9c </TASK> The aforementioned deadlock can be consistently reproduced by running the script below: audit-dupe-exe-deadlock.sh -------------------------- #!/bin/bash auditctl -D mkdir -p /tmp/foo touch /tmp/file auditctl -a always,exit -F exe=/tmp/file -F path=/tmp/file -S all -k dr mv /tmp/file /tmp/foo/file rm -Rf /tmp/foo This patch fixes the issue by introducing struct audit_watch_ctx to pass the fsnotify event context down to audit_alloc_mark(). By utilizing the already-resolved directory inode provided by the event, we bypass the kern_path_parent() path resol ---truncated--- | ||||