Export limit exceeded: 46030 CVEs match your query. Please refine your search to export 10,000 CVEs or fewer.
Search
Search Results (46030 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-89479 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: stop processing a packet once its association is deleted sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv() looks the association up only when chunk->asoc is NULL, and caches the result in chunk->asoc and chunk->transport without taking a reference. A packet that matches no association is handed to the endpoint, so a peer can bundle COOKIE ECHO, SHUTDOWN and SHUTDOWN ACK in one packet. The COOKIE ECHO creates the association, the SHUTDOWN chunk caches it, and with the outqueue empty the SHUTDOWN ACK reaches sctp_sf_do_9_2_final(), so the association and its transports are freed. The endpoint loop has no counterpart to the asoc->base.dead check in sctp_assoc_bh_rcv(). The next chunk writes to last_time_heard in the freed transport and is then passed to sctp_do_sm() with the freed association. The transport is freed through RCU, so this needs the packet to come off the socket backlog, where the loop runs in task context. The endpoint loop cannot do the same check: it holds no reference on the association, so reading asoc->base.dead would itself be a use-after-free. Mark the packet for discard in the command interpreter, just before it deletes the association. That is also before sctp_inq_free() releases the chunk on the association receive path. sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook() issues SCTP_CMD_DELETE_TCB for the temporary association, while the one the packet belongs to stays alive. A restarting peer can bundle DATA behind its COOKIE ECHO, so compare against chunk->asoc and leave that case alone. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89478 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: drop a chunk if its transport was removed sctp_rcv() resolves the transport once per packet and leaves it in chunk->transport. The lookup reference, or the one sctp_add_backlog() takes if the socket is owned by userspace, keeps it around until the chunk has been processed. An authenticated ASCONF DEL-IP can remove it in the meantime. sctp_assoc_rm_peer() takes the transport out of the association and calls sctp_transport_free(), which tags it dead and drops the reference the association held. There is a window on both paths: the packet can sit on the socket backlog, and on the direct path the lookup completes before bh_lock_sock(). The DATA chunk in that packet puts the removed transport back into asoc->peer.last_data_from. Once the packet is done that reference goes away and the transport is freed by RCU, so the next delayed SACK carries the pointer into the SACK chunk and sctp_outq_select_transport() reads the freed transport's state. Drop the chunk in sctp_inq_push(), next to the existing rcvr->dead check. Both paths reach it with the association's socket lock held. The peer retransmits it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81001 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: slip: fix use-after-free in sl_sync() slip_devs[] stores bare net_device pointers and takes no reference on them. sl_sync() and sl_alloc() walk that table from slip_open() under rtnl_lock(), while an entry is dropped by sl_free_netdev(), which sl_setup() installs as dev->priv_destructor. priv_destructor is called from netdev_run_todo(), which deliberately runs with the RTNL semaphore released so that it can sleep while waiting for the device refcount to drop: /* Snapshot list, allow later requests */ list_replace_init(&net_todo_list, &list); __rtnl_unlock(); ... if (dev->priv_destructor) dev->priv_destructor(dev); /* slip_devs[i] = NULL */ if (dev->needs_free_netdev) free_netdev(dev); ... /* Free network device */ kobject_put(&dev->dev.kobj); So rtnl_lock() does not serialise slip_open() against the teardown at all. sl_sync() can load slip_devs[i] while the entry is still published and dereference it after netdev_run_todo() has run the destructor and released the device: CPU0 (slip_open) CPU1 (slip_close) unregister_netdev() rtnl_unlock() netdev_run_todo() __rtnl_unlock() rtnl_lock() sl_sync() dev = slip_devs[i] priv_destructor(dev) slip_devs[i] = NULL kobject_put(&dev->dev.kobj) /* dev is freed */ sl = netdev_priv(dev) if (sl->tty || sl->leased) /* use-after-free */ BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sl_sync drivers/net/slip/slip.c:730 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in slip_open+0xef4/0x1210 drivers/net/slip/slip.c:806 Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880712dac71 by task syz-executor.2/6506 CPU: 2 PID: 6506 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.1.134-syzkaller-00260-g0c8fc3469765 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: sl_sync drivers/net/slip/slip.c:730 [inline] slip_open+0xef4/0x1210 drivers/net/slip/slip.c:806 tty_ldisc_open+0xa2/0x120 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:433 tty_set_ldisc+0x324/0x720 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:564 tiocsetd drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2428 [inline] tty_ioctl+0x5f0/0x1530 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2712 Allocated by task 6502: alloc_netdev_mqs+0x98/0xfe0 net/core/dev.c:10719 sl_alloc drivers/net/slip/slip.c:756 [inline] slip_open+0x36d/0x1210 drivers/net/slip/slip.c:817 tty_ldisc_open+0xa2/0x120 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:433 tty_set_ldisc+0x324/0x720 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:564 Freed by task 6497: device_release+0xa2/0x240 drivers/base/core.c:2507 kobject_put+0x179/0x280 lib/kobject.c:729 netdev_run_todo+0x6c8/0xef0 net/core/dev.c:10509 slip_close+0x166/0x1c0 drivers/net/slip/slip.c:906 tty_ldisc_close+0x113/0x1a0 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:456 tty_ldisc_kill+0x94/0x160 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:614 tty_ldisc_release+0xe3/0x2b0 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:782 tty_release+0xbcc/0xe70 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1860 Commit e58c19124189 ("slip: Fix use-after-free Read in slip_open") fixed a different source of stale entries - a device left in slip_devs[] after slip_open() freed it on the registration error path - and does not address this race, which is why the report survives it. Drop the entry from ndo_uninit instead. unregister_netdevice() calls ndo_uninit under RTNL, before the device is queued to netdev_run_todo(), so an entry that sl_sync() can still see while holding RTNL belongs to a device that cannot be freed until RTNL is dropped. sl_free_netdev() stays only for the slip_open() error path, where register_netdevice() may have failed before ndo_init and ndo_uninit is then not called either. Both running for the same device is harmless: the ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-80994 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvswitch: fix flow mask use-after-free on flow deletion The commit in the Fixes tag below made so flow->mask free is scheduled via RCU right after it is removed from the flow table. The pointer stays in the flow structure and it can be accessible while in the same RCU critical section. This is done to avoid requiring ovs_mutex for the ovs_flow_free(). However, while removing the flow during processing of CMD_DEL, we do not take RCU read lock before the removal, and ovs_flow_cmd_fill_info() uses the flow->mask pointer afterwards. The RCU read lock is taken, but it's already late at that point. The comment on that line acknowledges that the lock is cosmetic and doesn't serve a real purpose. This leads to use-after-free if the RCU grace period passes between removal and the filling. It is a short race window, but it is there and can lead to a real crash in case memory allocation for the info takes a bit longer: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __ovs_nla_put_key net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c:1996 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ovs_nla_put_key+0x2463/0x2e30 net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c:2250 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88801ee89970 by task ovs_flow_del_ec/9487 Call Trace: <TASK> __ovs_nla_put_key net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c:1996 ovs_nla_put_key+0x2463/0x2e30 net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c:2250 ovs_flow_cmd_fill_info+0x420/0x9c0 net/openvswitch/datapath.c:930 ovs_flow_cmd_del+0x53a/0x970 net/openvswitch/datapath.c:1467 ... netlink_rcv_skb+0x156/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2556 </TASK> Allocated by task 9487: mask_alloc net/openvswitch/flow_table.c:967 flow_mask_insert net/openvswitch/flow_table.c:1012 ovs_flow_tbl_insert+0xea2/0x1a90 net/openvswitch/flow_table.c:1084 ovs_flow_cmd_new+0x7e3/0xd90 net/openvswitch/datapath.c:1086 ... netlink_rcv_skb+0x156/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2556 Freed by task 9485: rcu_free_sheaf+0x1e/0x100 mm/slub.c:5978 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2645 rcu_core+0x59c/0x10c0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2897 handle_softirqs+0x1e4/0x9a0 kernel/softirq.c:622 ... instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062 ovs_flow_tbl_remove() must be called after the ovs_flow_cmd_fill_info() to avoid this race. This also helps with cleaning up the forced cast and the cosmetic RCU read lock. Before the commit in the Fixes tag the order did not matter as long as the flow object itself was not freed. A wider RCU critical section could be another option, but we have a GFP_KERNEL allocation in the way. Reported by Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative as ZDI-CAN-32042. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80982 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: fix use-after-free in smc_rx_pipe_buf_release() smc_rx_splice() hands RMB pages to a pipe and takes a socket reference per entry so the smc_sock stays alive until the reader finishes. The connection does not: a concurrent close runs smc_conn_free(), which releases the receive buffer back to the link group pool. smc_rx_pipe_buf_release() tests sk_state before taking the socket lock. The state can change between the test and the lock, and smc_rx_update_cons() then dereferences conn->rmb_desc and walks conn->lgr, which smc_conn_free() has already released. On the is_reg_err path smcr_buf_unuse() frees the descriptor outright, so this is a use-after-free. Take the socket lock first and test conn->freed instead. smc_conn_free() sets that flag before releasing anything, and every caller holds the socket lock. The two paths exclude each other: either the pipe release runs first with everything valid, or it sees the flag and skips the update. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80977 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: skbuff: don't touch shared zerocopy state in skb_tx_error() skb_tx_error() completes the zerocopy uarg and clears SKBFL_ALL_ZEROCOPY, and skb_zcopy_downgrade_managed() clears SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS. Both live in skb_shinfo(), which every clone shares, while the caller only owns the reference it is about to drop. Through a clone it tells the producer its pages are free and drops SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG for an skb that is still in flight. Open vSwitch reaches this with a non-last OVS_ACTION_ATTR_RECIRC: clone_execute() sends a skb_clone() into ovs_dp_process_packet() while do_execute_actions() keeps forwarding the original, and skb_clone() does not privatise the frags here -- skb_orphan_frags() returns early on SKBFL_DONT_ORPHAN. A flow miss on the clone then strips the marker from the packet still being forwarded, and a later local ESP delivery decrypts in place over frags it does not own privately. Skip it for a cloned skb. Nothing is lost: skb_release_data() clears the zerocopy state once the last reference to the shared data goes. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80971 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: bcd2000: clear the URB pointers on disconnect bcd2000_free_usb_related_resources() frees both URBs and leaves the pointers behind: usb_kill_urb(bcd2k->midi_out_urb); usb_kill_urb(bcd2k->midi_in_urb); usb_free_urb(bcd2k->midi_out_urb); usb_free_urb(bcd2k->midi_in_urb); The rawmidi device outlives that call. A substream that is still open when the device is unplugged reaches bcd2000_midi_send() from the trigger path on close. That function writes to the freed URB and then hands it to the USB core: bcd2k->midi_out_urb->transfer_buffer_length = BUFSIZE; ... ret = usb_submit_urb(bcd2k->midi_out_urb, GFP_ATOMIC); usb_kill_urb() does not stop a later submission either, so a submit that races the disconnect can requeue the URB after it has been reaped. midi_in_urb is exposed the same way: bcd2000_input_complete() resubmits it from the completion handler. KASAN on 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bcd2000_midi_send [snd_bcd2000] Write of size 4 at addr ffff00001827d388 by task bpoc/168 __asan_store4 bcd2000_midi_send [snd_bcd2000] bcd2000_midi_output_trigger [snd_bcd2000] snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1 close_substream.part.0 Freed by task 168: usb_free_urb bcd2000_disconnect [snd_bcd2000] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in usb_submit_urb Read of size 8 at addr ffff00001827d3b8 by task bpoc/168 Clear both pointers after freeing and test them on the paths that can still run. Poison the URBs before freeing them: usb_poison_urb() waits for a running completion handler and rejects any later submission, so after it returns the input path is quiesced and only the rawmidi trigger path can still reach bcd2000_midi_send(). No unpoison is needed; the URBs are freed on the next line. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> | ||||
| CVE-2026-80722 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: validate individual TWT params before driver setup ieee80211_process_rx_twt_action() only partially validates a received S1G TWT setup frame before queueing it. An individual agreement can therefore reach ieee80211_s1g_rx_twt_setup() with twt->length too short for the full struct ieee80211_twt_params. The individual path passes twt to drv_add_twt_setup(). Both the tracepoint and the driver callback consume the complete parameters block, not merely req_type. Do not pass a short individual agreement to the driver. Broadcast agreements remain unchanged because they are rejected locally after accessing only req_type. [edit commit message to not overclaim lack of validation nor understate driver impact] | ||||
| CVE-2026-80717 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: validate Adaptation Indication parameter length The Adaptation Layer Indication parameter contains a fixed 32-bit Adaptation Code Point after its parameter header. However, sctp_verify_param() accepts a header-only parameter because the generic parameter walker only requires the header to be present. sctp_process_param() then reads adaptation_ind beyond the declared parameter. When the malformed parameter is last in an INIT, the read starts at the receive skb tail, and the value is copied into the state cookie returned in the INIT ACK. This may disclose four receive-buffer tail bytes. Require the declared parameter length to match the fixed structure size and abort the association through the existing invalid parameter length path otherwise. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80716 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: pcm: wake linked drain waiters on unlink snd_pcm_drain() on a linked stream parks an on-stack wait entry on the drained peer's runtime->sleep, and after schedule_timeout() removes it only if that peer is still found in the caller's group. If group membership changes during the wait and the sleep ends by signal or timeout (so autoremove_wake_function() does not run), finish_wait() is skipped and snd_pcm_drain() returns with the entry still queued on that stream's sleep list; a later wake_up() then walks a freed stack frame. This is reachable by unlinking either the drained or the draining stream. Unlike the close path (snd_pcm_drop() -> snd_pcm_post_stop()), snd_pcm_unlink() never wakes the sleep queues. Wake every group member under the group lock before the membership change, so a linked drainer is released and drops its entry while the streams are still grouped. The window was opened when snd_pcm_link_rwsem stopped being held across the wait and the removal became conditional on group membership (see Fixes). The later switch to finish_wait() kept that conditional removal, so the signal/timeout case remained. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80714 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipvs: do not propagate one-packet flag to synced conns Synced connections can be created before their destination exists. When the destination is later added, ip_vs_bind_dest() copies connection flags from the destination into cp->flags. IP_VS_CONN_F_ONE_PACKET connections are not synced. If a synced connection inherits IP_VS_CONN_F_ONE_PACKET while it is already hashed, expiry can treat it as a one-packet connection and skip unlinking the existing conn_tab node, leaving stale hash nodes pointing at a freed struct ip_vs_conn. Drop IP_VS_CONN_F_ONE_PACKET from destination flags when binding synced connections. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80707 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: j1939: transport: j1939_session_fresh_new(): initialize receive buffer Zero the allocated buffer in j1939_session_fresh_new() to ensure it contains no residual data. While there is a potential performance impact if users allocate maximum sized ETP buffers, most real-world use cases are not noticeably affected since the maximum known buffer size is typically around 65K. [mkl: add Message-ID] | ||||
| CVE-2026-80681 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: re-fetch eth header after route_shortcircuit() Before route_shortcircuit(), the eth header pointer is cached from eth_hdr(skb). Inside route_shortcircuit(), pskb_may_pull() can be called, which may reallocate skb->head. In this case, returning to vxlan_xmit() leaves the cached eth pointer pointing to freed memory, leading to a use-after-free when dereferencing eth->h_dest. Fix this by updating eth = eth_hdr(skb) after calling route_shortcircuit(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-80613 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: veth: fix NAPI leak in XDP enable error path During XDP enablement in veth, if xdp_rxq_info_reg() or xdp_rxq_info_reg_mem_model() fails, the driver rolls back the changes. However, the rollback loop: for (i--; i >= start; i--) { decrements the loop index 'i' before the first iteration. This correctly skips unregistering the rxq for the failed index 'i' (as registration failed or was already cleaned up), but it also erroneously skips calling netif_napi_deli() for rq[i].xdp_napi. Since netif_napi_add() was already called for index 'i', this leaves a dangling napi_struct in the device's napi_list. When the veth device is later destroyed, the freed queue memory (which contains the leaked NAPI structure) can be reused. The subsequent device teardown iterates the NAPI list and corrupts the reallocated memory, leading to UAF. Fix this by explicitly deleting the NAPI association for the failed index 'i' before rolling back the successfully configured queues. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80601 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: gw: acquire ethernet header only after skb realloc The pskb_may_pull() called by batadv_get_vid() could reallocate the buffer behind the skb. Variables which were pointing to the old buffer need to be reassigned to avoid an use-after-free. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80590 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.6 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: inet: frags: strip GSO state from fragments before reassembly A virtio_net_hdr (tun/tap, or AF_PACKET with PACKET_VNET_HDR) can mark an IPv4 or IPv6 fragment as GSO; nothing relates gso_type to frag_off. inet_frag_reasm_prepare()/inet_frag_reasm_finish() keep the first fragment's skb as the head of the reassembled datagram, including its shinfo->gso_size/gso_type/gso_segs, and chain the remaining fragments on frag_list with whatever linear/paged layout they arrived with. After ip_defrag() (ip_local_deliver(), nf_defrag_ipv4, ...) the reassembled skb therefore still claims to be GSO (SKB_GSO_DODGY), and the next software segmentation point - udp_rcv_segment() on local delivery, validate_xmit_skb(), or the ip_finish_output_gso() slow path - hands it to skb_segment(). skb_segment()'s frag_list walk assumes GRO-shaped input and hits one of its BUG_ON()s. Two writes to a tap by an unprivileged user in its own userns are enough: kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:4899! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 82 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.2.0-pentest+ #2 RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0x20ca/0x48b0 Call Trace: <TASK> __udp_gso_segment+0x29a/0x27d0 udp4_ufo_fragment+0x458/0x6c0 inet_gso_segment+0x429/0x1340 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x233/0x4f0 __skb_gso_segment+0x308/0x660 udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x440/0xad0 udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0xc7/0x2c0 udp_rcv+0x16ce/0x2260 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x197/0x2d0 ip_local_deliver+0x430/0x690 ip_rcv+0x16f/0x1f0 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x15e/0x1c0 __netif_receive_skb+0x1e/0x110 netif_receive_skb+0xf6/0x5c0 tun_rx_batched.isra.0+0x3ab/0x790 tun_get_user+0x17c3/0x3550 tun_chr_write_iter+0xba/0x1b0 vfs_write+0x646/0x1130 </TASK> Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt This runs with BH disabled, so it is a panic rather than an oops. The same is reachable with CAP_NET_RAW in a netns where a defrag point precedes a GSO point, and from a guest whose VMM forwards virtio_net_hdr to a tap. The SKB_GSO_DODGY frag_list checks added by commit 3dcbdb134f32 ("net: gso: Fix skb_segment splat when splitting gso_size mangled skb having linear-headed frag_list") and by commit 9e4b7a99a03a ("net: gso: fix panic on frag_list with mixed head alloc types") do not cover it: page-backed heads skip them, and kmalloc heads skip them when gso_size == skb_headlen(head), which the sender controls. An skb entering a frag queue is an IP fragment by definition and cannot legitimately carry GSO state: GRO does not merge fragments and the stack segments before it fragments, so only untrusted sources are affected. This has been reachable since commit f43798c27684 ("tun: Allow GSO using virtio_net_hdr"), the first path that let userspace attach GSO metadata to an IP fragment. Reset the GSO fields of every fragment as it is queued, in inet_frag_queue_insert(), which IPv4, IPv6, nf_conntrack_reasm and 6lowpan reassembly share; then neither the head nor the frag_list members of the reassembled skb carry them (the members matter too: the ip_do_fragment()/ip6_fragment() fast paths send them out as they are). The head may remain CHECKSUM_PARTIAL; that is already accepted on receive and resolved by skb_checksum_help() in ip_do_fragment()/ip6_fragment() on forward. Tested on top of net.git (dc4b95b8fee9), x86_64: the tap reproducer above, two further IPv4 frag_list geometries that reach BUG_ON(i >= nfrags) and BUG_ON(!list_skb->head_frag), and an IPv6 fragment-header variant (udp6_ufo_fragment()) each panic the unpatched kernel; with this patch all four datagrams are delivered intact and nothing is logged. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80589 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: stop the timeout timer when releasing a never added disk disk_release() undoes blk_mq_init_allocated_queue() for a disk whose probe failed before add_disk(), but it only calls blk_mq_exit_queue(). Nothing there stops q->timeout, and that timer rolls forward: it stays pending until it next expires, not until the last request completes. So if the driver issued any I/O before adding the disk, the request_queue is freed while still linked into a timer wheel bucket. Commit 6f8191fdf41d ("block: simplify disk shutdown") dropped the blk_cleanup_queue() call that used to stop it. __del_gendisk() and blk_mq_destroy_queue() still do; only the probe failure path lost it. nvme gets there because nvme_update_ns_info() submits Report Zones or FDP io-mgmt-recv on ns->queue before the disk is added, so a later failure - a concurrent reset setting NVME_CTRL_FROZEN, or device_add_disk() failing - lands in put_disk() with the timer armed: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in detach_if_pending+0x30c/0x340 Write of size 8 at addr ffff888004d71310 by task kworker/u8:2/37 __timer_delete_sync+0x156/0x240 kernel/time/timer.c:1621 blk_sync_queue+0x22/0x40 block/blk-core.c:222 nvme_sync_queues+0x100/0x150 drivers/nvme/host/core.c:5362 nvme_reset_work+0x138/0x930 drivers/nvme/host/pci.c:3264 Allocated by task 34: __blk_mq_alloc_disk+0x33/0x100 block/blk-mq.c:4462 nvme_alloc_ns+0x290/0x3870 drivers/nvme/host/core.c:4146 Freed by task 0: blk_free_queue_rcu+0x3a/0x50 block/blk-core.c:254 rcu_core+0xc10/0x1730 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2857 The queue being synced there is ctrl->admin_q, only a victim sharing a timer wheel bucket with the freed queue's dangling entry; other runs tripped in enqueue_timer(), __run_timers() or blk_mq_timeout_work(). Failing nvme_alloc_ns() with a debug patch makes it deterministic: one leaked timer trips KASAN within seconds, while 1987 patched releases produced no splat. Stop the timer and the queue work items before blk_mq_exit_queue(), like blk_mq_destroy_queue() does. Found by FuzzNvme. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80586 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: options: reset DSS fields in case of unexpected size A remote peer could send a malformed DSS with a wrong size, followed by another DSS or MPC + Data. In this case, the first suboption will be ignored, but leaving some fields written, which could lead to inconsistency or access uninitialized data. Explicitly reset the fields that could have been modified in case of unexpected size. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80579 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: clear fb_info->mode before deleting a videomode fb_set_var() can delete a mode from info->modelist when userspace passes FB_ACTIVATE_INV_MODE through FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO. The code checks that the mode being deleted is not the current info->var and that fbcon is not using it, but it does not check fb_info->mode. fb_info->mode may still point into the modelist entry being deleted. If the entry is freed, later mode sysfs reads through show_mode() can dereference a stale pointer. Clear fb_info->mode before calling fb_delete_videomode() when it matches the mode being removed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80549 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.2 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/vfio_ccw: Move cp cleanup out of not operational The fsm_notoper() routine is called when the device has been lost, and is (by definition) no longer operational. Since this can happen asynchronously from the normal behavior of the driver, the cleanup may happen when holding other locks in the calling sequence (notably, the cio subchannel lock). Push the cleanup of the private->cp resources to a workqueue, where it can be done out from under that lock sequence and a future patch can safely manage the locking requirements. | ||||