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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-113595 | 1 Sharkord | 1 Sharkord | 2026-10-23 | 4.3 Medium |
| Sharkord before 0.0.26 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the others.changeLogo tRPC mutation that allows any authenticated member to modify the server logo without the MANAGE_SETTINGS permission. Attackers can remove the current logo and replace it with an uploaded image that is published to every connected client. | ||||
| CVE-2026-111683 | 2026-10-23 | 5.4 Medium | ||
| Allegro Ralph through 20260902.1 contains a missing authorization vulnerability that allows authenticated staff users to bypass rack model permissions because RalphPermission skips checks for views without a queryset. Attackers can call DCAssetsView and SRRacksAPIView at /api/rack/<id> and /api/server_room/<id> to read asset hostnames, serials and management IPs, and to modify, move or create racks. | ||||
| CVE-2026-55463 | 2026-10-23 | 6.5 Medium | ||
| The Goobi viewer is a web application that allows digitised material to be displayed in a web browser. From version 4.11.0 to before version 26.05, several Jakarta WebSocket endpoints in goobi-viewer-core (DownloadTaskEndpoint, CampaignEndpoint, AutocompleteEndpoint, UserEndpoint) accept connections without verifying that the associated HttpSession belongs to a logged-in user, and none validate the Origin header against an allowlist. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore connect to these endpoints; through CampaignEndpoint this allows polluting the in-process crowdsourcing page-lock map and broadcasting forged lock messages, disrupting reviewers' work. This issue has been patched in version 26.05. | ||||
| CVE-2026-115478 | 2026-10-23 | N/A | ||
| obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.0.1 until 1.31.4, `create_entity`, `link_entities`, `rename_entity`, `unlink_entities` and `delete_entity` regenerate memory notes from SQLite at the computed `memory/<type>/<name>.md` path without reliably preserving note ownership or the consistency of a failed lifecycle operation. During shared materialization, a hand-authored note or an orphan left by a different entity whose name sanitized to the same path could have its entire body overwritten on the next write naming that type and name, with non-owned frontmatter preserved. `rename_entity` also seeded the destination path with a direct atomic write without validating ownership and could overwrite a foreign note there. Separately, several tools mutated SQLite before fallible filesystem work: `create_entity` and `link_entities` inserted the row or relation before materialization; `rename_entity` updated the entity, including a retired status, before updating its note; `unlink_entities` removed a relation before rematerializing the source note; and `delete_entity`'s cascade removed the target and its relations before rematerializing neighbouring notes. A later filesystem failure could therefore leave a row or relation changed and the memory graph inconsistent with the notes on disk even when the operation failed. An authorized caller with the required memory-tool permissions could, without intending to, destroy the body of a vault note outside the entity being written; `delete_entity` additionally requires its deletion permission and destructive confirmation, which this memory flaw does not bypass. Snapshots-before-write through `restore_note` mitigate the overwrite only where snapshots are enabled and the note had previously been written through obsidian-tc. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4. | ||||
| CVE-2026-115477 | 2026-10-23 | N/A | ||
| obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker's control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human's approval, while still requiring the caller's ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a fabricated approval, because the server cannot verify that the client displayed the form or that a human saw it. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4. | ||||
| CVE-2026-114623 | 2026-10-23 | 6.5 Medium | ||
| baserCMS is a website development framework. In versions 5.0.0 before 5.3.2 and 5.4.0 before 5.4.2, an authenticated user with only theme-file view permission can traverse outside the theme directory through the optional BcThemeFile plugin's Admin web screen. ThemeFilesController::parseArgs() constructs a path containing literal ../ segments, and the view and edit actions pass it to ThemeFilesService::get() without containment validation. Authorization checks the unresolved request path, after which ThemeFile::_getContents() reads the resolved file and exposes its contents in the form textarea. A client must preserve the dot segments rather than normalize them away. Readable files are limited to .php, .css, .js, and .ctp; this can disclose application source and config/install.php database credentials in MySQL or PostgreSQL deployments, while SQLite configurations have an empty database password. Reading config/app_local.php may expose the Security.salt fallback, which is effective only when not overridden by environment configuration. The flaw does not disclose .env, .pem, or SQLite .db files, does not itself permit file writes or code execution, and does not affect the separate API getFullpath() route. The plugin is disabled by default and unauthenticated requests are not sufficient. This issue has been patched in versions 5.3.2 and 5.4.2. | ||||
| CVE-2026-56836 | 1 Mervinpraison | 1 Praisonai | 2026-10-23 | 8.2 High |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.112 to before version 4.6.59, PraisonAI's installed console entrypoint is Typer-first. In current releases, the recipe command is registered in the Typer app and praisonai recipe serve dispatches to the deprecated Typer command in src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/recipe.py. That Typer command can start the Recipe HTTP server on a non-localhost interface with no authentication. It prints a deprecation warning, and then launches the server. Because config.auth is absent, create_app() does not attach the API-key or JWT middleware. Unauthenticated requests can then reach the recipe API and, when enabled, /admin/reload. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59. | ||||
| CVE-2026-56838 | 1 Mervinpraison | 1 Praisonai | 2026-10-23 | 7.8 High |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.87 to before version 4.6.59, PraisonAI recipe execution blocks default-denied dangerous tools unless the caller explicitly passes allow_dangerous_tools=True. The normal recipe.run() path enforces this with _check_tool_policy(). The streaming path, recipe.run_stream(), loads the same recipe, checks dependencies, and then calls _execute_recipe() without running the dangerous-tool policy check. As a result, a recipe that honestly declares execute_command in TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools is denied by recipe.run(), but reaches the execution engine through recipe.run_stream() with allow_dangerous_tools=False. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59. | ||||
| CVE-2026-57116 | 1 Mervinpraison | 1 Praisonai | 2026-10-23 | 9.8 Critical |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.2.1 to before version 4.6.59, PraisonAI's AgentOS FastAPI deployment surface remains unauthenticated in current main and in releases after the published patched version for GHSA-pm96-6xpr-978x / CVE-2026-40151. The chat route directly calls agent.chat(request.message). No-auth and wrong-bearer requests both execute the deployed agent. This is broader than passive metadata disclosure. In any deployment where AgentOS wraps agents with tools, private context, memory, API integrations, or cost-bearing model calls, an unauthenticated reachable client can drive those agents. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59. | ||||
| CVE-2026-57142 | 1 Mervinpraison | 1 Praisonai | 2026-10-23 | 7.8 High |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.87 to before version 4.6.61, PraisonAI recipe execution has a dangerous-tool policy that is supposed to block default-denied tools unless the caller explicitly passes allow_dangerous_tools=True. That policy only checks tools declared in TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools. For steps-based recipes, the actual execution path loads workflow.yaml with YAMLWorkflowParser. That parser resolves agent-level tools: declarations and preserves top-level approve:. Workflow.start() then installs those YAML-approved tools into the approval context. As a result, an untrusted recipe can omit execute_command from TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools, declare it in workflow.yaml agents.*.tools, and add top-level approve: [execute_command]. The caller did not set allow_dangerous_tools=True, but the recipe policy allows the recipe and the workflow approval path self-approves the critical shell tool. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.61. | ||||
| CVE-2026-57117 | 1 Mervinpraison | 1 Praisonai | 2026-10-23 | 8.8 High |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.6.10 to before version 4.6.59, LocalManagedAgent / SandboxedAgent compute bridging wraps read_file, list_files, and write_file when a compute provider is attached. The bridge converts those file operations into shell command strings using raw path arguments, then sends those strings to shell-backed compute providers. An attacker who can influence a file-tool path argument can break out of the quoted path and execute arbitrary shell commands in the compute environment. With compute="local", commands execute through the local subprocess compute provider on the host. With Docker, commands execute in the container. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59. | ||||
| CVE-2026-56832 | 1 Mervinpraison | 1 Praisonai | 2026-10-23 | 8.8 High |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.2 to before version 4.6.59, praisonai.bots.DiscordApproval approves a pending dangerous tool call when it sees any later non-bot message in the configured Discord channel whose text is classified as approval, such as yes. As a result, any user who can post in the configured approval channel can approve a pending high-risk tool call by sending yes after the approval message appears. the same PoV also shows that the Slack and Telegram messaging approval backends have no explicit approver allowlist parameter, but the primary report-grade issue is the Discord backend's unthreaded channel cross-talk: the approving message does not need to be a reply or otherwise request-bound. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59. | ||||
| CVE-2026-56835 | 1 Mervinpraison | 1 Praisonai | 2026-10-23 | 8.3 High |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 3.11.0 to before version 4.6.59, PraisonAI's Slack bot applies its configured allowed_users, allowed_channels, and unknown-user pairing policy in the normal Slack message event handler, but not in the adjacent Slack app_mention event handler. A Slack workspace user who can mention the bot in a channel where the Slack app is present can trigger the configured PraisonAI agent even when: the sender is not in BotConfig.allowed_users; the channel is not in BotConfig.allowed_channels; unknown_user_policy="deny" is configured; and the same event content is correctly dropped by the normal message handler. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59. | ||||
| CVE-2026-114356 | 2026-10-23 | N/A | ||
| Missing authorization in the system-privileged 'DJIUpdateService' binder in DJI CrystalSky ZS600C firmware v0.3.9.7 through v0.6.6.9 on Android allows a local application with no permissions to invoke privileged operations, including factory reset with user-data wipe (transaction 153), shutdown (105), clock/timezone change (101/123), and the firmware-apply hand-off (151), because onTransact() performs no caller-identity or permission check. | ||||
| CVE-2026-114354 | 2026-10-23 | N/A | ||
| Missing authorization in the native binder service 'android.dji.server' (transaction code 1018) in DJI CrystalSky ZS600C firmware v0.3.9.7 through v0.6.6.9 on Android allows a local application with no permissions to execute arbitrary OS commands as root, because the handler passes a caller-supplied string to system() in the root-privileged 'assistant' daemon without any caller-identity or permission check. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93639 | 2026-10-23 | 8.7 High | ||
| A missing authorization vulnerability in Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) allows a delegated administrator with no explicit administrative grants to overwrite global Zimlet configuration through ConfigureZimletRequest. The uploaded configuration can also add an attacker-controlled domain to the proxy allowlist of the default class of service. If a signed-in user in that class opens a crafted /service/proxy URL, Zimbra serves attacker-controlled HTML under its own origin. The resulting JavaScript can read mailbox data and perform authenticated actions as the victim. Exploitation requires a delegated-administrator account and access to the admin SOAP service; the browser compromise additionally requires the victim to open the crafted URL. ZCS 10.1.16 and 10.1.20 are affected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-111738 | 2026-10-23 | 5.5 Medium | ||
| The Speed Optimizer WordPress plugin before 7.8.5 does not verify network-level privilege before applying an option change to the whole multisite network, nor restrict which option may be changed, allowing a site administrator who is not a Super Admin to create or overwrite network-wide options. | ||||
| CVE-2026-112230 | 2026-10-23 | 3.7 Low | ||
| The Popup Builder WordPress plugin before 4.4.6 does not perform authorization checks before trashing popup content in a maintenance routine that runs on unauthenticated requests, allowing unauthenticated attackers to move affected popups into the Trash and overwrite their stored preview data. | ||||
| CVE-2026-113501 | 2026-10-23 | 3.1 Low | ||
| The LiteSpeed Cache WordPress plugin before 7.9.2 does not perform a capability check on its admin-notice dismissal handler, and the nonce it relies on is not bound to the specific notice being dismissed, so on sites in certain configurations a low-privileged authenticated user (Subscriber) can dismiss administrative notices the LiteSpeed Cache WordPress plugin before 7.9.2 marks as non-dismissible, including a warning that sensitive files may be publicly accessible. | ||||
| CVE-2026-94262 | 2026-10-23 | 8.1 High | ||
| The Advanced Custom Fields: Extended WordPress plugin before 0.9.2.8, Advanced Custom Fields: Extended PRO WordPress plugin before 0.9.2.8 does not verify that the requester is authorised to edit the targeted user account in the update-user action of its front-end Forms module, performing that check only when the target account holds an administrator role, which allows unauthenticated visitors to overwrite any non-administrator account's credentials and obtain a session for that account. Exploitation requires the site to publish a form whose user-update action maps its target to a visitor-submitted value rather than to the default current user. | ||||