| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: pwc: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure
The vb2 framework hands buffers to the driver via buf_queue() before
calling start_streaming(). If start_streaming() returns an error
without first returning those buffers via vb2_buffer_done(),
vb2_start_streaming() fires WARN_ON(owned_by_drv_count) and the queued
buffers leak.
pwc's start_streaming() had two early returns that hit this trap:
-ENODEV when the USB device was already disconnected, and -ERESTARTSYS
when mutex_lock_interruptible() was interrupted by a signal. Call the
existing pwc_cleanup_queued_bufs() helper with VB2_BUF_STATE_QUEUED
before returning (matching the state already used by the
pwc_isoc_init() error path in the same function).
This mirrors the uvcvideo fix in commit 4cf3b6fd54eb ("media: uvcvideo:
Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: rtl2832_sdr: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure
The vb2 framework hands buffers to the driver via buf_queue() before
calling start_streaming(). If start_streaming() returns an error
without first returning those buffers via vb2_buffer_done(),
vb2_start_streaming() fires WARN_ON(owned_by_drv_count) and the queued
buffers leak.
rtl2832_sdr_start_streaming() had multiple error paths that hit this
trap: two direct early returns (-ENODEV, -ERESTARTSYS), plus six
`goto err` paths covering subdev s_power, tuner setup, ADC setup,
stream-buffer allocation, urb allocation, and urb submission failures.
None of them returned the queued buffers.
The original function had no distinct success exit and fell straight
through into the err label, which previously only did mutex_unlock and
"return ret". Adding queued-buffer cleanup at err must therefore be
paired with an explicit success return; otherwise every successful
start would also drain the buffer queue and kill streaming. Add that
success return, then add rtl2832_sdr_cleanup_queued_bufs() at the err
label and before each early return.
The cleanup helper takes a vb2_buffer_state argument so that the
start_streaming error paths can pass VB2_BUF_STATE_QUEUED (as
expected by userspace on start_streaming failure) while stop_streaming
keeps its existing VB2_BUF_STATE_ERROR semantics.
This mirrors the uvcvideo fix in commit 4cf3b6fd54eb ("media: uvcvideo:
Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure").
The err label still does not roll back power_ctrl(), frontend_ctrl(),
the POWER_ON flag, or stream/URB allocations that may have happened
before the failing step. Those are pre-existing leaks of a different
class and are not addressed here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath6kl: fix OOB access from firmware ADDBA window size
aggr_recv_addba_req_evt() logs a debug message when the firmware-supplied
win_sz is outside [AGGR_WIN_SZ_MIN, AGGR_WIN_SZ_MAX] but does not
return. The out-of-range win_sz is then used in TID_WINDOW_SZ() to
compute a kzalloc size and stored in rxtid->hold_q_sz, leading to
zero-size or overflowed allocations and subsequent out-of-bounds access.
Clean up any previously active aggregation session for the TID first,
then return early when win_sz is out of the valid range, instead of
proceeding with a broken allocation size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: close UDP tunnel sockets during netns teardown
proc_sctp_do_udp_port() starts per-net SCTP UDP tunneling sockets when
net.sctp.udp_port is set, and stops/restarts them when the sysctl value
changes. The netns exit path does not stop these sockets, so a namespace
can be torn down while its SCTP UDP tunnel sockets are still installed.
Close the UDP tunnel sockets from sctp_ctrlsock_exit() after unregistering
the per-net sysctl table. This prevents new sysctl writes from racing in
while the sockets are being released, and closes the sockets before the
control socket is destroyed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: bound pg_{temp,upmap,upmap_items} length to CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE
__decode_pg_temp() decodes an user-controlled length but only rejects
values large enough to overflow the allocation; it does not bound it to
CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE. The helper backs both pg_temp and pg_upmap decoding, and
apply_upmap()/get_temp_osds() later copy the decoded list into the fixed-size
on-stack array struct ceph_osds.osds[CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE]. A monitor that sends
an OSDMap with a pg_temp/pg_upmap entry longer than 32 thus causes a stack
out-of-bounds write.
An OSD set for a single PG can never exceed CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE, so reject longer
entries at decode time. The bound is well below the old overflow threshold, so
it also covers the allocation-size overflow the previous check guarded against.
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds
Write of size 4 ... by task exploit
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds (net/ceph/osdmap.c:2617 net/ceph/osdmap.c:2833)
calc_target (net/ceph/osd_client.c:1638)
__submit_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2394)
ceph_osdc_start_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2490)
ceph_osdc_call (net/ceph/osd_client.c:5164)
rbd_dev_image_probe (drivers/block/rbd.c:6899)
do_rbd_add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7138)
...
kernel BUG at net/ceph/osdmap.c:2670!
[ idryomov: do the same in __decode_pg_upmap_items() ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fscrypt: Add missing superblock check in find_or_insert_direct_key()
The legacy 'fscrypt_direct_keys' table caches master keys that are used
by v1 encryption policies that have FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY.
It's just a global table for all filesystems (since the keys can be
provided by the legacy process-subscribed keyrings mechanism, which
makes it difficult to reuse super_block::s_master_keys).
The entries in it ('struct fscrypt_direct_key') do contain a super_block
pointer, though, for passing to fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() when
the last inode that references the key is evicted.
However, when finding the fscrypt_direct_key for an inode, we weren't
actually comparing the super_block pointer. As a result, inodes with
different super_blocks could point to the same fscrypt_direct_key. That
could extend the lifetime of a fscrypt_direct_key beyond the
super_block it points to, causing a use-after-free later.
Fix this by creating distinct fscrypt_direct_key structs for distinct
super_block structs.
Note that this problem doesn't exist in the v2 policy equivalent
("per-mode keys"), since the data structures there are per super_block. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iomap: fix out-of-bounds bitmap_set() with zero-length range
ifs_set_range_dirty() and ifs_set_range_uptodate() compute last_blk
as (off + len - 1) >> i_blkbits. When off is 0 and len is 0, the
unsigned subtraction underflows to SIZE_MAX, producing a huge
last_blk and nr_blks value that causes bitmap_set() to write far
beyond the ifs->state allocation.
Regarding ifs_set_range_uptodate(), it is temporarily safe because len
cannot be passed in as 0. However, for ifs_set_range_dirty() this is
reachable from __iomap_write_end(): when copy_folio_from_iter_atomic()
returns 0 (e.g. user buffer fault) and the folio is already uptodate,
the guard at the top of __iomap_write_end() does not trigger because
!folio_test_uptodate() is false, and iomap_set_range_dirty() is called
with copied == 0.
Add a !len guard to both functions before the computation, so that a
zero-length range is a no-op. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: slip: serialize receive against buffer reallocation
sl_realloc_bufs() replaces rbuff and updates buffsize while holding
sl->lock. slip_receive_buf() reads those fields and writes through rbuff
without holding the lock.
An MTU change can therefore race with receive processing. An MTU shrink
can expose the new smaller rbuff with the old larger bound, causing an
out-of-bounds write. A receive callback which already loaded the old
rbuff can instead continue writing after that buffer has been freed.
Serialize receive processing with sl_realloc_bufs() by holding sl->lock
while consuming each receive batch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openvswitch: fix GSO userspace truncation underflow
OVS_ACTION_ATTR_TRUNC currently stores a delta from the original skb
length in OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen. When a later userspace action segments a
GSO skb, queue_gso_packets() reuses that delta for each smaller segment.
A segment can then reach queue_userspace_packet() with cutlen greater
than skb->len, underflowing the length passed to skb_zerocopy().
Store the maximum preserved length instead and bound each consumer
against the current skb length. Use U32_MAX as the no-truncation
sentinel so the value remains valid if skb geometry changes before a
consumer handles it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/vce: fix integer overflow in image size
Fix a security vulnerability where malicious VCE command streams
with oversized dimensions (e.g. 65536×65536) cause 32-bit integer
overflow, wrapping the calculated buffer size to 0. This bypasses
validation and allows GPU firmware to perform out-of-bound memory
access.
The fix uses 64-bit arithmetic to detect overflow and rejects
invalid dimensions before they reach the hardware.
V2: remove redundant check
V3: modify max height value
V4: remove size64
(cherry picked from commit cbe408dba581755ad1279a487ec786d8927d778d) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/pkey: Check length in pkey_pckmo handler implementation
Explicitly check the length of the target buffer in the pkey_pckmo
implementation of the key_to_protkey() handler function. The handler
function fails, if the generated output data exceeds the length of the
provided target buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio-net: fix len check in receive_big()
receive_big() bounds the device-announced length by
(big_packets_num_skbfrags + 1) * PAGE_SIZE. That is still too loose:
add_recvbuf_big() sets sg[1] to start at offset
sizeof(struct padded_vnet_hdr) into the first page, so the chain
actually carries hdr_len + (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(padded_vnet_hdr)) +
big_packets_num_skbfrags * PAGE_SIZE bytes -- 20 bytes less than the
check allows for the common hdr_len == 12 case.
A malicious virtio backend can announce a len in that gap. page_to_skb()
then walks one frag past the page chain, storing a NULL page->private
into skb_shinfo()->frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS], which is both an out-of-bounds
write past the static frag array and a NULL frag handed up the rx path.
Bound len by the size add_recvbuf_big() actually advertised. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: reject overflowing copy + len in bpf_msg_push_data()
When the scatterlist ring is full or nearly full, bpf_msg_push_data()
enters a copy fallback path and computes copy + len for the page
allocation size. Since len comes from BPF with arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING
and both are u32, a crafted len can wrap the sum to a small value,
causing an undersized allocation followed by an out-of-bounds memcpy.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffed104089a402
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
Call Trace:
__asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105)
bpf_msg_push_data (net/core/filter.c:2852 net/core/filter.c:2788)
bpf_prog_9ed8b5711920a7d7+0x2e/0x36
sk_psock_msg_verdict (net/core/skmsg.c:934)
tcp_bpf_sendmsg (net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:421 net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:584)
__sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2206)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
Add an overflow check before the allocation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: bound NTFS_DE view.data_off in UpdateRecordData{Root,Allocation}
In do_action()'s UpdateRecordDataRoot (fslog.c:3489) and
UpdateRecordDataAllocation (fslog.c:3697) cases, the memmove
destination is `Add2Ptr(e, le16_to_cpu(e->view.data_off))`,
where e->view.data_off comes from an on-disk NTFS_DE inside
an INDEX_ROOT or INDEX_BUFFER. Neither case validates
view.data_off + dlen against e->size; the existing
check_if_index_root / check_if_alloc_index helpers walk the
entry chain and validate the entry's offset, but not its
internal view fields.
The neighbouring read sites (e.g., fs/ntfs3/index.c when
iterating view entries) check view.data_off + view.data_size
<= e->size. Apply the same bound at the two memmove sites.
Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 via
pr_warn-only probe instrumentation: with view.data_off forced
to 0xFFFC, the memmove writes 32 bytes past the end of the
NTFS_DE.
This is similar in shape to Pavitra Jha's 2026-05-02 patch
"fs/ntfs3: prevent oob in case UpdateRecordDataRoot"
(<20260502105008.21827-1-jhapavitra98@gmail.com>) which
proposes calling ntfs3_bad_de_range(); that helper does not
exist in mainline. This patch uses inline checks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs
The QAT driver exposes a character device (qat_adf_ctl) with IOCTLs
for device configuration, start, stop, status query and enumeration.
These IOCTLs are not part of any public uAPI header and have no known
in-tree or out-of-tree users. Device lifecycle is already managed via
sysfs.
The ioctl interface also increases the attack surface and is the
subject of a number of bug reports.
Remove the character device, the IOCTL definitions, and the related
data structures (adf_dev_status_info, adf_user_cfg_key_val,
adf_user_cfg_section, adf_user_cfg_ctl_data). Drop the now-unused
adf_cfg_user.h header and strip adf_ctl_drv.c down to the minimal
module_init/module_exit hooks for workqueue, AER, and crypto/compression
algorithm registration.
Clean up leftover dead code that was only reachable from the removed
IOCTL paths: adf_cfg_del_all(), adf_devmgr_verify_id(),
adf_devmgr_get_num_dev(), adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(),
adf_get_vf_real_id() and the unused ADF_CFG macros.
Additionally, drop the entry associated to QAT IOCTLs in
ioctl-number.rst. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: fix MLE defragmentation
If either reconf or EPCS multi-link element (MLE) is contained in
a non-transmitted profile, the defragmentation routine is called
with a pointer to the defragmented copy, but the original elements.
This is incorrect for two reasons:
- if the original defragmentation was needed, it will not find the
correct data
- if the original frame is at a higher address, the parsing will
potentially overrun the heap data (though given the layout of
the buffers, only into the new defragmentation buffer, and then
it has to stop and fail once that's filled with copied data.
Fix it by tracking the container along with the pointer and in
doing so also unify the two almost identical defragmentation
routines. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: virtio: Validate control metadata from the device
virtio-snd control handling trusts the device-provided control type and
value count returned by the device.
That metadata is then used directly to index g_v2a_type_map[] in
virtsnd_kctl_info(), and to size loops and memcpy() operations in
virtsnd_kctl_get() and virtsnd_kctl_put() against fixed-size
virtio_snd_ctl_value and snd_ctl_elem_value arrays.
A buggy or malicious device can therefore trigger out-of-bounds access by
advertising an invalid control type or an oversized value count.
Validate control type and count once in virtsnd_kctl_parse_cfg(), before
querying enumerated items or exposing the control to ALSA. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: compress: Fix task creation error unwind
snd_compr_task_new() allocates the driver task before validating the
returned DMA buffers and reserving file descriptors. When either of
those later steps fails, the core frees its task wrapper and DMA-buffer
references without calling the driver's task_free() callback. Any
driver resources allocated by task_create() are therefore leaked.
The dual-fd allocation path also jumps to cleanup without storing the
negative get_unused_fd_flags() result in retval. Since retval still
contains the successful task_create() return value, TASK_CREATE can
incorrectly report success although the task was discarded.
Preserve the fd allocation errors and call task_free() when failure
occurs after a successful task_create() callback. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI/IOV: Skip VF Resizable BAR restore on read error
sriov_restore_vf_rebar_state() uses the VF Resizable BAR Control register
to decide how many VF BARs to restore (nbars) and which VF BAR each
iteration addresses (bar_idx). bar_idx indexes into dev->sriov->barsz[],
which has only PCI_SRIOV_NUM_BARS (6) entries.
When a device does not respond, config reads typically return
PCI_ERROR_RESPONSE (~0). Both fields are 3 bits wide, so nbars and bar_idx
both evaluate to 7. The barsz[] access then goes out of bounds. UBSAN
reports this as:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/pci/iov.c:948:51 index 7 is out of range for type 'resource_size_t [6]'
Observed on an NVIDIA RTX PRO 1000 GPU (GB207GLM) that stopped responding
during a failed GC6 power state exit. The subsequent pci_restore_state()
invoked sriov_restore_vf_rebar_state() while config reads returned
0xffffffff, triggering the splat.
Bail out if any VF Resizable BAR Control read returns PCI_ERROR_RESPONSE.
No further VF BARs are touched, which is safe because a config read that
returns PCI_ERROR_RESPONSE indicates the device is unreachable and
restoration is pointless. This mirrors the guard in
pci_restore_rebar_state(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: multitouch: fix out-of-bounds bit access on mt_io_flags
mt_io_flags is a single unsigned long, but mt_process_slot(),
mt_release_pending_palms() and mt_release_contacts() use it as a
per-slot bitmap indexed by the slot number. That slot number is only
bounded by td->maxcontacts, which is taken from the device's
ContactCountMaximum feature report and can be up to 255, not by
BITS_PER_LONG.
As a result, a multitouch device that advertises a large contact count
makes set_bit()/clear_bit() operate past the mt_io_flags word and
corrupt the adjacent members of struct mt_device. The sticky-fingers
release timer is the easiest way to reach this. mt_release_contacts()
runs
for (i = 0; i < mt->num_slots; i++)
clear_bit(i, &td->mt_io_flags);
with num_slots == maxcontacts. For maxcontacts around 250 the loop
clears the bits that overlap td->applications.next, zeroing that list
head, and the list_for_each_entry() that immediately follows then
dereferences NULL. The kernel panics from timer (softirq) context. On a
KASAN build this shows up as a general protection fault in
mt_release_contacts() with a null-ptr-deref at offset 0x58, which is
offsetof(struct mt_application, num_received).
The state is reachable from an untrusted USB or Bluetooth HID
multitouch device; no local privileges are required.
Store the per-slot active state in a separately allocated bitmap sized
for maxcontacts, the same pattern already used for pending_palm_slots,
and keep only MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING in mt_io_flags. The two
"mt_io_flags & MT_IO_SLOTS_MASK" arming checks become
bitmap_empty(td->active_slots, td->maxcontacts).
Move MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING back to bit 0. It was bumped to bit 32 by the
same commit to leave the low byte for the slot bits; with the slot bits
gone it fits in bit 0 again, which also keeps it within the unsigned
long on 32-bit. |
