| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: prevent immediate PASID reuse case
PASID resue could cause interrupt issue when process
immediately runs into hw state left by previous
process exited with the same PASID, it's possible that
page faults are still pending in the IH ring buffer when
the process exits and frees up its PASID. To prevent the
case, it uses idr cyclic allocator same as kernel pid's.
(cherry picked from commit 8f1de51f49be692de137c8525106e0fce2d1912d) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: dwc: ep: Flush MSI-X write before unmapping its ATU entry
Endpoint drivers use dw_pcie_ep_raise_msix_irq() to raise an MSI-X
interrupt to the host using a writel(), which generates a PCI posted write
transaction. There's no completion for posted writes, so the writel() may
return before the PCI write completes. dw_pcie_ep_raise_msix_irq() also
unmaps the outbound ATU entry used for the PCI write, so the write races
with the unmap.
If the PCI write loses the race with the ATU unmap, the write may corrupt
host memory or cause IOMMU errors, e.g., these when running fio with a
larger queue depth against nvmet-pci-epf:
arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: 0x0000010000000010
arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: 0x0000020000000000
arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: 0x000000090000f040
arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: 0x0000000000000000
arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: event: F_TRANSLATION client: 0000:01:00.0 sid: 0x100 ssid: 0x0 iova: 0x90000f040 ipa: 0x0
arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: unpriv data write s1 "Input address caused fault" stag: 0x0
Flush the write by performing a readl() of the same address to ensure that
the write has reached the destination before the ATU entry is unmapped.
The same problem was solved for dw_pcie_ep_raise_msi_irq() in commit
8719c64e76bf ("PCI: dwc: ep: Cache MSI outbound iATU mapping"), but there
it was solved by dedicating an outbound iATU only for MSI. We can't do the
same for MSI-X because each vector can have a different msg_addr and the
msg_addr may be changed while the vector is masked.
[bhelgaas: commit log] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: tegra210-quad: Protect curr_xfer check in IRQ handler
Now that all other accesses to curr_xfer are done under the lock,
protect the curr_xfer NULL check in tegra_qspi_isr_thread() with the
spinlock. Without this protection, the following race can occur:
CPU0 (ISR thread) CPU1 (timeout path)
---------------- -------------------
if (!tqspi->curr_xfer)
// sees non-NULL
spin_lock()
tqspi->curr_xfer = NULL
spin_unlock()
handle_*_xfer()
spin_lock()
t = tqspi->curr_xfer // NULL!
... t->len ... // NULL dereference!
With this patch, all curr_xfer accesses are now properly synchronized.
Although all accesses to curr_xfer are done under the lock, in
tegra_qspi_isr_thread() it checks for NULL, releases the lock and
reacquires it later in handle_cpu_based_xfer()/handle_dma_based_xfer().
There is a potential for an update in between, which could cause a NULL
pointer dereference.
To handle this, add a NULL check inside the handlers after acquiring
the lock. This ensures that if the timeout path has already cleared
curr_xfer, the handler will safely return without dereferencing the
NULL pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: qrtr: Drop the MHI auto_queue feature for IPCR DL channels
MHI stack offers the 'auto_queue' feature, which allows the MHI stack to
auto queue the buffers for the RX path (DL channel). Though this feature
simplifies the client driver design, it introduces race between the client
drivers and the MHI stack. For instance, with auto_queue, the 'dl_callback'
for the DL channel may get called before the client driver is fully probed.
This means, by the time the dl_callback gets called, the client driver's
structures might not be initialized, leading to NULL ptr dereference.
Currently, the drivers have to workaround this issue by initializing the
internal structures before calling mhi_prepare_for_transfer_autoqueue().
But even so, there is a chance that the client driver's internal code path
may call the MHI queue APIs before mhi_prepare_for_transfer_autoqueue() is
called, leading to similar NULL ptr dereference. This issue has been
reported on the Qcom X1E80100 CRD machines affecting boot.
So to properly fix all these races, drop the MHI 'auto_queue' feature
altogether and let the client driver (QRTR) manage the RX buffers manually.
In the QRTR driver, queue the RX buffers based on the ring length during
probe and recycle the buffers in 'dl_callback' once they are consumed. This
also warrants removing the setting of 'auto_queue' flag from controller
drivers.
Currently, this 'auto_queue' feature is only enabled for IPCR DL channel.
So only the QRTR client driver requires the modification. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: suspend array while updating raid_disks via sysfs
In raid1_reshape(), freeze_array() is called before modifying the r1bio
memory pool (conf->r1bio_pool) and conf->raid_disks, and
unfreeze_array() is called after the update is completed.
However, freeze_array() only waits until nr_sync_pending and
(nr_pending - nr_queued) of all buckets reaches zero. When an I/O error
occurs, nr_queued is increased and the corresponding r1bio is queued to
either retry_list or bio_end_io_list. As a result, freeze_array() may
unblock before these r1bios are released.
This can lead to a situation where conf->raid_disks and the mempool have
already been updated while queued r1bios, allocated with the old
raid_disks value, are later released. Consequently, free_r1bio() may
access memory out of bounds in put_all_bios() and release r1bios of the
wrong size to the new mempool, potentially causing issues with the
mempool as well.
Since only normal I/O might increase nr_queued while an I/O error occurs,
suspending the array avoids this issue.
Note: Updating raid_disks via ioctl SET_ARRAY_INFO already suspends
the array. Therefore, we suspend the array when updating raid_disks
via sysfs to avoid this issue too. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
functionfs: fix the open/removal races
ffs_epfile_open() can race with removal, ending up with file->private_data
pointing to freed object.
There is a total count of opened files on functionfs (both ep0 and
dynamic ones) and when it hits zero, dynamic files get removed.
Unfortunately, that removal can happen while another thread is
in ffs_epfile_open(), but has not incremented the count yet.
In that case open will succeed, leaving us with UAF on any subsequent
read() or write().
The root cause is that ffs->opened is misused; atomic_dec_and_test() vs.
atomic_add_return() is not a good idea, when object remains visible all
along.
To untangle that
* serialize openers on ffs->mutex (both for ep0 and for dynamic files)
* have dynamic ones use atomic_inc_not_zero() and fail if we had
zero ->opened; in that case the file we are opening is doomed.
* have the inodes of dynamic files marked on removal (from the
callback of simple_recursive_removal()) - clear ->i_private there.
* have open of dynamic ones verify they hadn't been already removed,
along with checking that state is FFS_ACTIVE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix race condition validating r_parent before applying state
Add validation to ensure the cached parent directory inode matches the
directory info in MDS replies. This prevents client-side race conditions
where concurrent operations (e.g. rename) cause r_parent to become stale
between request initiation and reply processing, which could lead to
applying state changes to incorrect directory inodes.
[ idryomov: folded a kerneldoc fixup and a follow-up fix from Alex to
move CEPH_CAP_PIN reference when r_parent is updated:
When the parent directory lock is not held, req->r_parent can become
stale and is updated to point to the correct inode. However, the
associated CEPH_CAP_PIN reference was not being adjusted. The
CEPH_CAP_PIN is a reference on an inode that is tracked for
accounting purposes. Moving this pin is important to keep the
accounting balanced. When the pin was not moved from the old parent
to the new one, it created two problems: The reference on the old,
stale parent was never released, causing a reference leak.
A reference for the new parent was never acquired, creating the risk
of a reference underflow later in ceph_mdsc_release_request(). This
patch corrects the logic by releasing the pin from the old parent and
acquiring it for the new parent when r_parent is switched. This
ensures reference accounting stays balanced. ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/smaps: fix race between smaps_hugetlb_range and migration
smaps_hugetlb_range() handles the pte without holdling ptl, and may be
concurrenct with migration, leaing to BUG_ON in pfn_swap_entry_to_page().
The race is as follows.
smaps_hugetlb_range migrate_pages
huge_ptep_get
remove_migration_ptes
folio_unlock
pfn_swap_entry_folio
BUG_ON
To fix it, hold ptl lock in smaps_hugetlb_range(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ublk: fix race between io_uring_cmd_complete_in_task and ublk_cancel_cmd
ublk_cancel_cmd() calls io_uring_cmd_done() to complete uring_cmd, but
we may have scheduled task work via io_uring_cmd_complete_in_task() for
dispatching request, then kernel crash can be triggered.
Fix it by not trying to canceling the command if ublk block request is
started. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: quota: fix to avoid warning in dquot_writeback_dquots()
F2FS-fs (dm-59): checkpoint=enable has some unwritten data.
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 8013 at fs/quota/dquot.c:691 dquot_writeback_dquots+0x2fc/0x308
pc : dquot_writeback_dquots+0x2fc/0x308
lr : f2fs_quota_sync+0xcc/0x1c4
Call trace:
dquot_writeback_dquots+0x2fc/0x308
f2fs_quota_sync+0xcc/0x1c4
f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x3d4/0x9b0
f2fs_issue_checkpoint+0x1bc/0x2c0
f2fs_sync_fs+0x54/0x150
f2fs_do_sync_file+0x2f8/0x814
__f2fs_ioctl+0x1960/0x3244
f2fs_ioctl+0x54/0xe0
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa8/0xe4
invoke_syscall+0x58/0x114
checkpoint and f2fs_remount may race as below, resulting triggering warning
in dquot_writeback_dquots().
atomic write remount
- do_remount
- down_write(&sb->s_umount);
- f2fs_remount
- ioctl
- f2fs_do_sync_file
- f2fs_sync_fs
- f2fs_write_checkpoint
- block_operations
- locked = down_read_trylock(&sbi->sb->s_umount)
: fail to lock due to the write lock was held by remount
- up_write(&sb->s_umount);
- f2fs_quota_sync
- dquot_writeback_dquots
- WARN_ON_ONCE(!rwsem_is_locked(&sb->s_umount))
: trigger warning because s_umount lock was unlocked by remount
If checkpoint comes from mount/umount/remount/freeze/quotactl, caller of
checkpoint has already held s_umount lock, calling dquot_writeback_dquots()
in the context should be safe.
So let's record task to sbi->umount_lock_holder, so that checkpoint can
know whether the lock has held in the context or not by checking current
w/ it.
In addition, in order to not misrepresent caller of checkpoint, we should
not allow to trigger async checkpoint for those callers: mount/umount/remount/
freeze/quotactl. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix block group refcount race in btrfs_create_pending_block_groups()
Block group creation is done in two phases, which results in a slightly
unintuitive property: a block group can be allocated/deallocated from
after btrfs_make_block_group() adds it to the space_info with
btrfs_add_bg_to_space_info(), but before creation is completely completed
in btrfs_create_pending_block_groups(). As a result, it is possible for a
block group to go unused and have 'btrfs_mark_bg_unused' called on it
concurrently with 'btrfs_create_pending_block_groups'. This causes a
number of issues, which were fixed with the block group flag
'BLOCK_GROUP_FLAG_NEW'.
However, this fix is not quite complete. Since it does not use the
unused_bg_lock, it is possible for the following race to occur:
btrfs_create_pending_block_groups btrfs_mark_bg_unused
if list_empty // false
list_del_init
clear_bit
else if (test_bit) // true
list_move_tail
And we get into the exact same broken ref count and invalid new_bgs
state for transaction cleanup that BLOCK_GROUP_FLAG_NEW was designed to
prevent.
The broken refcount aspect will result in a warning like:
[1272.943527] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
[1272.943967] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 61 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xba/0x110
[1272.944731] Modules linked in: btrfs virtio_net xor zstd_compress raid6_pq null_blk [last unloaded: btrfs]
[1272.945550] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 61 Comm: kworker/u32:1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.14.0-rc5+ #108
[1272.946368] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[1272.946585] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
[1272.947273] Workqueue: btrfs_discard btrfs_discard_workfn [btrfs]
[1272.947788] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xba/0x110
[1272.949532] RSP: 0018:ffffbf1200247df0 EFLAGS: 00010282
[1272.949901] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa14b00e3f800 RCX: 0000000000000000
[1272.950437] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffbf1200247c78 RDI: 00000000ffffdfff
[1272.950986] RBP: ffffa14b00dc2860 R08: 00000000ffffdfff R09: ffffffff90526268
[1272.951512] R10: ffffffff904762c0 R11: 0000000063666572 R12: ffffa14b00dc28c0
[1272.952024] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffa14b00dc2868 R15: 000001285dcd12c0
[1272.952850] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa14d33c40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[1272.953458] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[1272.953931] CR2: 00007f838cbda000 CR3: 000000010104e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[1272.954474] Call Trace:
[1272.954655] <TASK>
[1272.954812] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xba/0x110
[1272.955173] ? __warn.cold+0x93/0xd7
[1272.955487] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xba/0x110
[1272.955816] ? report_bug+0xe7/0x120
[1272.956103] ? handle_bug+0x53/0x90
[1272.956424] ? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x60
[1272.956700] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[1272.957011] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xba/0x110
[1272.957399] btrfs_discard_cancel_work.cold+0x26/0x2b [btrfs]
[1272.957853] btrfs_put_block_group.cold+0x5d/0x8e [btrfs]
[1272.958289] btrfs_discard_workfn+0x194/0x380 [btrfs]
[1272.958729] process_one_work+0x130/0x290
[1272.959026] worker_thread+0x2ea/0x420
[1272.959335] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[1272.959644] kthread+0xd7/0x1c0
[1272.959872] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[1272.960172] ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50
[1272.960474] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[1272.960745] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[1272.961035] </TASK>
[1272.961238] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Though we have seen them in the async discard workfn as well. It is
most likely to happen after a relocation finishes which cancels discard,
tears down the block group, etc.
Fix this fully by taking the lock arou
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix the recovery flow of the UMR QP
This patch addresses an issue in the recovery flow of the UMR QP,
ensuring tasks do not get stuck, as highlighted by the call trace [1].
During recovery, before transitioning the QP to the RESET state, the
software must wait for all outstanding WRs to complete.
Failing to do so can cause the firmware to skip sending some flushed
CQEs with errors and simply discard them upon the RESET, as per the IB
specification.
This race condition can result in lost CQEs and tasks becoming stuck.
To resolve this, the patch sends a final WR which serves only as a
barrier before moving the QP state to RESET.
Once a CQE is received for that final WR, it guarantees that no
outstanding WRs remain, making it safe to transition the QP to RESET and
subsequently back to RTS, restoring proper functionality.
Note:
For the barrier WR, we simply reuse the failed and ready WR.
Since the QP is in an error state, it will only receive
IB_WC_WR_FLUSH_ERR. However, as it serves only as a barrier we don't
care about its status.
[1]
INFO: task rdma_resource_l:1922 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
Tainted: G W 6.12.0-rc7+ #1626
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:rdma_resource_l state:D stack:0 pid:1922 tgid:1922 ppid:1369
flags:0x00004004
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x420/0xd30
schedule+0x47/0x130
schedule_timeout+0x280/0x300
? mark_held_locks+0x48/0x80
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xe5/0x1a0
wait_for_completion+0x75/0x130
mlx5r_umr_post_send_wait+0x3c2/0x5b0 [mlx5_ib]
? __pfx_mlx5r_umr_done+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_ib]
mlx5r_umr_revoke_mr+0x93/0xc0 [mlx5_ib]
__mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x299/0x520 [mlx5_ib]
? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x40
? wait_for_completion+0xfe/0x130
? rdma_restrack_put+0x63/0xe0 [ib_core]
ib_dereg_mr_user+0x5f/0x120 [ib_core]
? lock_release+0xc6/0x280
destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x1d/0x60 [ib_uverbs]
uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x58/0x1d0 [ib_uverbs]
uobj_destroy+0x3f/0x70 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x3e4/0xbb0 [ib_uverbs]
? __pfx_uverbs_destroy_def_handler+0x10/0x10 [ib_uverbs]
? __lock_acquire+0x64e/0x2080
? mark_held_locks+0x48/0x80
? find_held_lock+0x2d/0xa0
? lock_acquire+0xc1/0x2f0
? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xcb/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
? __fget_files+0xc3/0x1b0
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xe7/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xcb/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x1b0/0xa70
do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x140
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f99c918b17b
RSP: 002b:00007ffc766d0468 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc766d0578 RCX:
00007f99c918b17b
RDX: 00007ffc766d0560 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI:
0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffc766d0540 R08: 00007f99c8f99010 R09:
000000000000bd7e
R10: 00007f99c94c1c70 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:
00007ffc766d0530
R13: 000000000000001c R14: 0000000040246a80 R15:
0000000000000000
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udp: Deal with race between UDP socket address change and rehash
If a UDP socket changes its local address while it's receiving
datagrams, as a result of connect(), there is a period during which
a lookup operation might fail to find it, after the address is changed
but before the secondary hash (port and address) and the four-tuple
hash (local and remote ports and addresses) are updated.
Secondary hash chains were introduced by commit 30fff9231fad ("udp:
bind() optimisation") and, as a result, a rehash operation became
needed to make a bound socket reachable again after a connect().
This operation was introduced by commit 719f835853a9 ("udp: add
rehash on connect()") which isn't however a complete fix: the
socket will be found once the rehashing completes, but not while
it's pending.
This is noticeable with a socat(1) server in UDP4-LISTEN mode, and a
client sending datagrams to it. After the server receives the first
datagram (cf. _xioopen_ipdgram_listen()), it issues a connect() to
the address of the sender, in order to set up a directed flow.
Now, if the client, running on a different CPU thread, happens to
send a (subsequent) datagram while the server's socket changes its
address, but is not rehashed yet, this will result in a failed
lookup and a port unreachable error delivered to the client, as
apparent from the following reproducer:
LEN=$(($(cat /proc/sys/net/core/wmem_default) / 4))
dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=${LEN} of=tmp.in
while :; do
taskset -c 1 socat UDP4-LISTEN:1337,null-eof OPEN:tmp.out,create,trunc &
sleep 0.1 || sleep 1
taskset -c 2 socat OPEN:tmp.in UDP4:localhost:1337,shut-null
wait
done
where the client will eventually get ECONNREFUSED on a write()
(typically the second or third one of a given iteration):
2024/11/13 21:28:23 socat[46901] E write(6, 0x556db2e3c000, 8192): Connection refused
This issue was first observed as a seldom failure in Podman's tests
checking UDP functionality while using pasta(1) to connect the
container's network namespace, which leads us to a reproducer with
the lookup error resulting in an ICMP packet on a tap device:
LOCAL_ADDR="$(ip -j -4 addr show|jq -rM '.[] | .addr_info[0] | select(.scope == "global").local')"
while :; do
./pasta --config-net -p pasta.pcap -u 1337 socat UDP4-LISTEN:1337,null-eof OPEN:tmp.out,create,trunc &
sleep 0.2 || sleep 1
socat OPEN:tmp.in UDP4:${LOCAL_ADDR}:1337,shut-null
wait
cmp tmp.in tmp.out
done
Once this fails:
tmp.in tmp.out differ: char 8193, line 29
we can finally have a look at what's going on:
$ tshark -r pasta.pcap
1 0.000000 :: ? ff02::16 ICMPv6 110 Multicast Listener Report Message v2
2 0.168690 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192
3 0.168767 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192
4 0.168806 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192
5 0.168827 c6:47:05:8d:dc:04 ? Broadcast ARP 42 Who has 88.198.0.161? Tell 88.198.0.164
6 0.168851 9a:55:9a:55:9a:55 ? c6:47:05:8d:dc:04 ARP 42 88.198.0.161 is at 9a:55:9a:55:9a:55
7 0.168875 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192
8 0.168896 88.198.0.164 ? 88.198.0.161 ICMP 590 Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
9 0.168926 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192
10 0.168959 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192
11 0.168989 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 4138 60260 ? 1337 Len=4096
12 0.169010 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 42 60260 ? 1337 Len=0
On the third datagram received, the network namespace of the container
initiates an ARP lookup to deliver the ICMP message.
In another variant of this reproducer, starting the client with:
strace -f pasta --config-net -u 1337 socat UDP4-LISTEN:1337,null-eof OPEN:tmp.out,create,tru
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: Don't process extts if PTP is disabled
The ice_ptp_extts_event() function can race with ice_ptp_release() and
result in a NULL pointer dereference which leads to a kernel panic.
Panic occurs because the ice_ptp_extts_event() function calls
ptp_clock_event() with a NULL pointer. The ice driver has already
released the PTP clock by the time the interrupt for the next external
timestamp event occurs.
To fix this, modify the ice_ptp_extts_event() function to check the
PTP state and bail early if PTP is not ready. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm/dpu: Add mutex lock in control vblank irq
Add a mutex lock to control vblank irq to synchronize vblank
enable/disable operations happening from different threads to prevent
race conditions while registering/unregistering the vblank irq callback.
v4: -Removed vblank_ctl_lock from dpu_encoder_virt, so it is only a
parameter of dpu_encoder_phys.
-Switch from atomic refcnt to a simple int counter as mutex has
now been added
v3: Mistakenly did not change wording in last version. It is done now.
v2: Slightly changed wording of commit message
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/571854/ |
| A race condition was addressed with additional validation. This issue is fixed in iOS 27 and iPadOS 27, macOS Golden Gate 27. A malicious app may be able to break out of its sandbox. |
| A security flaw has been discovered in a2aproject a2a-rs up to 0.4.4. The affected element is the function InMemoryTaskStore::update of the file a2a-server/src/task_store/inmemory.rs. The manipulation results in race condition. The attack may be performed from remote. The patch is identified as 7050c7d329238539424ee46440e23b91c4825bee. It is advisable to implement a patch to correct this issue. |
| A flaw was found in the admin backend of gvfs. The privileged gvfsd-admin daemon changes the ownership of newly created private D-Bus sockets by calling the link-following chown() function on a pathname inside a user-controlled directory. A local attacker can exploit this via a Time-of-Check Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition and exchange the socket pathname with a symbolic link pointing to an arbitrary root-owned file (such as /etc/pam.d/su). The daemon subsequently follows the symlink and changes the ownership of the targeted root-owned file to the attacker's user ID. This allows an authenticated local attacker to modify critical system files, leading to a full local privilege escalation to root. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: use d_instantiate_new() in ntfs_create_inode() and murder syzbot's "WARNING in do_new_mount" saga
ntfs_create_inode() creates a new inode via ntfs_new_inode(). It hashes
it with insert_inode_locked() and so it's marked as I_NEW until
unlock_new_inode().
ntfs 3 calls d_instantiate() in between though... Since the dentry was
already hashed by the lookup before the create any path walk finds it
without touching the parent's i_rwsem and so can lock the inode.
If the inode is a directory unlock_new_inode() calls
lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() and marks i_rwsem with the
i_mutex_dir_key class.
That resets the count and the owner of a lock somebody else may already
hold by now...
syzbot has been spamming us with the same godforsaken bug
"WARNING in do_new_mount"
since 2023. I can't take it anymore so I went looking. Afaict, syzbot's
executor chdirs into a freshly mounted ntfs3 image, creates a
directory and then mounts some pseudofs on it. Everytime the mkdir()
takes longer than syzbot waits mount() runs concurrently:
mkdir("./sys") mount(NULL, "./sys", "sysfs")
ntfs_create_inode()
d_instantiate()
user_path_at() finds the dentry
do_lock_mount()
inode_lock(inode)
namespace_lock()
unlock_new_inode()
lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key()
init_rwsem(&inode->i_rwsem)
unlock_mount()
inode_unlock(inode)
The mount side then releases a lock that according to the rwsem nobody
holds:
DEBUG_RWSEMS_WARN_ON((rwsem_owner(sem) != current) && ...):
count = 0x0, magic = 0xffff888043a854e8, owner = 0x0,
curr 0xffff888000244880, list empty
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5346 at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1368 __up_write
Call Trace:
inode_unlock include/linux/fs.h:877 [inline]
unlock_mount fs/namespace.c:2892 [inline]
do_new_mount_fc fs/namespace.c:3828 [inline]
do_new_mount+0x777/0xa40 fs/namespace.c:3887
On PREEMPT_RT the same thing shows up as
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(rt_mutex_owner(lock) != current)
WARNING: kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h:193 at rt_mutex_slowunlock
The up_write() underflows the reset count. A following inode_lock() on
that directory then never returns. A path walk into the new directory
racing with the mkdir() corrupts the lock the same way via
inode_lock_shared() in lookup_slow().
Switch to d_instantiate_new() and drop the trailing unlock_new_inode().
All error paths bail out before that point with I_NEW still set and
keep using discard_new_inode().
May we never see this fscking bug report again. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: libwx: fix races in Tx timestamp handling
wx->ptp_tx_skb is shared between the Tx path, the PTP auxiliary
worker and the timestamp cleanup paths. The
WX_STATE_PTP_TX_IN_PROGRESS bit prevents multiple Tx paths from
submitting timestamp requests, but does not serialize the worker
against cleanup.
As a result, wx_ptp_clear_tx_timestamp() can free an skb after
wx_ptp_tx_hwtstamp_work() has obtained its pointer. The worker may
then pass the freed skb to skb_tstamp_tx() and release the same
reference again.
The cleanup path may also clear the in-progress bit while the worker
is still processing the old skb. This allows the Tx path to publish a
new skb which the worker can subsequently overwrite with NULL,
leaking its reference.
Add a dedicated spinlock to protect publication and consumption of
the Tx timestamp skb. Detach the skb and clear the in-progress bit
while holding the lock, then deliver the timestamp and release the skb
after dropping it. Use the same locked cleanup in the quiesce path,
but keep the detach there free of register accesses: quiesce runs
during PCIe error recovery, where MMIO is not reliable, and it
deliberately did not touch the device before. The lock is taken with
interrupts disabled, because netpoll can call ndo_start_xmit() with
hard interrupts already off.
When handling a Tx DMA mapping failure, keep the transmit path
reference until after comparing the skb under the lock. This prevents
skb address reuse from making the error path mistake a newer timestamp
request for the failed one. |
