| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: cap advertised IP tunnel headroom
IP tunnel devices derive their advertised needed_headroom from lower
output devices. A stack of user-created devices can make the derived
value larger than the 16-bit skb header offsets can represent. Once IP
output reserves it, skb head expansion can wrap those offsets.
The runtime transmit path already caps a growing needed_headroom at 512.
Apply the same cap when tunnel configuration publishes needed_headroom
derived from a lower output device.
Capping the advertised value is safe: IP tunnel transmit still expands
the skb when a packet needs more headroom. A nonsensical stacked
configuration can therefore incur an extra reallocation, but it cannot
publish an unbounded reservation to upper layers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Fix UVD decode image min size calculation
This needs to use pitch instead of width. Also reject pitch
over 4096 to avoid overflow.
(cherry picked from commit b41c8cb12e202b220353332ab87dc01a11f69304) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/radeon: fix integer overflow in radeon_align_pitch()
radeon_align_pitch() has the same kind of overflow issue as the old
amdgpu helper: both the alignment round-up add and the final
'aligned * cpp' calculation can overflow signed int.
If that wraps, radeon_mode_dumb_create() can end up returning an
invalid pitch or creating a zero-sized dumb buffer.
Fix this by using check_add_overflow() for the alignment round-up and
check_mul_overflow() for the final pitch calculation, returning 0 on
overflow. Also reject zero pitch and size in
radeon_mode_dumb_create().
Found via AST-based call-graph analysis using sqry. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: Correct data type for scan index to avoid infinite loop
A kernel soft lockup was observed during Wi-Fi scanning on the 6GHz band.
The CPU becomes stuck in rtw89_hw_scan_add_chan_ax for over 20 seconds,
leading to a system panic.
RIP points to 0f b6 c3 (movzbl %bl, %eax), which zero-extends
the low 8 bits of RBX into RAX.
RBX (the counter i) has reached a huge value: 0x137466a1.
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u16:4:6124]
Workqueue: events_unbound cfg80211_wiphy_work [cfg80211]
RIP: 0010:rtw89_hw_scan_add_chan_ax+0xb3/0x6e0 [rtw89_core]
Code: a0 48 89 45 a8 44 89 6d 9c 44 89 75 98 eb 29 66 66 2e 0f 1f
84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 83 c3 01
<0f> b6 c3 41 3b 44 24 74 0f 83 0b 02 00 00 0f b6 c3 48 8d 14 80 49
RSP: 0018:ffffcb48cbaa39f8 EFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: 0000000000000005 RBX: 00000000137466a1 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff89ffc9d851a8 RSI: 0000000000004f0d RDI: 0000000096af0130
RBP: ffffcb48cbaa3a60 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8a00b7502080
R10: ffff8a00b75ff600 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff89ffc7553870
R13: ffff8a00b7ac8f19 R14: ffff8a00b75020d8 R15: ffff89ffc3d54d80
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8a014f962000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007558d7f9f4c4 CR3: 0000000178040001 CR4: 00000000001706f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
rtw89_hw_scan_prep_chan_list_ax+0x8a/0x400 [rtw89_core]
rtw89_hw_scan_start+0x546/0x8a0 [rtw89_core]
? rtw89_fw_h2c_default_cmac_tbl+0x13c/0x1f0 [rtw89_core]
rtw89_ops_hw_scan+0xae/0x120 [rtw89_core]
drv_hw_scan+0xbb/0x180 [mac80211]
__ieee80211_start_scan+0x2fc/0x750 [mac80211]
ieee80211_request_scan+0xe/0x20 [mac80211]
ieee80211_scan+0x123/0x190 [mac80211]
rdev_scan+0x40/0x110 [cfg80211]
cfg80211_scan_6ghz+0x5a1/0xa30 [cfg80211]
By objdump with source:
for (i = 0; i < req->n_6ghz_params; i++) {
5fbc0: 83 c3 01 add $0x1,%ebx --> i++
5fbc3: 0f b6 c3 movzbl %bl,%eax --> get counter
fbc6: 41 3b 44 24 74 cmp 0x74(%r12),%eax
* RBX: 00000000137466a1 -> %bl = a1 -> EAX = 000000a1 (161) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/srpt: fix integer overflow in immediate data length check
imm_buf->len is a user-controlled uint32_t received from the network.
Adding it to imm_data_offset without overflow checking allows a
malicious initiator to send len=0xFFFFFFFF, causing req_size to wrap
around to a small value, bypassing the bounds check, and subsequently
passing a ~4GB length to sg_init_one().
Use check_add_overflow() to detect wrapping before the comparison. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Account allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Windows USB Video Driver allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Windows Raw Image Extension allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| A flaw was found in spice-server. The GLZ encoder dictionary restore path truncates a size_t allocation size to int when calling the malloc callback, allowing a malicious authenticated SPICE client during VM live migration to trigger a massive heap buffer overflow by sending a crafted max_encoders value in migration data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpu: host1x: Fix iommu_map_sgtable() return value check
Commit "iommu: return full error code from iommu_map_sg[_atomic]()"
changed iommu_map_sgtable() to return an ssize_t and negative values
in error cases, rather than a size_t and a zero.
pin_job() also was incorrectly assigning to 'int', which could cause
overflows into negative values.
Update pin_job() to correctly check for errors from iommu_map_sgtable. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Windows Overlay Filter allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Integer wraparound in psqlODBC SQLBindParameter allows an application, or an attacker who controls how many parameters the application binds on one statement, to corrupt heap memory. psqlODBC stores the binding count in a signed 16-bit field. Binding parameter number 32768 wraps that count to -32768. Binding parameter 32769 then writes about 2.5 MB of zeros starting 1.25 MB before the binding array, which crashes the application or leaves it running on a corrupted heap. Applications that build parameter lists from untrusted input, such as an IN (?, ?, ...) list, are exposed. Versions before psqlODBC 18.00.0005 are affected. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Windows NTFS allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| A flaw was found in Cockpit. An authenticated local user with a large user identifier (UID) can cause unauthorized modification and disclosure of login records. On 32-bit systems, an integer overflow during session accounting allows the user's login process to read or overwrite the legacy log entries of other accounts. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Windows Spaceport.sys allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-log: fix a bitset_size overflow on 32bit machines
Commit c20e36b7631d ("dm log: fix out-of-bounds write due to
region_count overflow") made sure that region_count could fit in an
unsigned int. But the bitmap memory isn't allocated based on
region_count. It uses bitset_size (a size_t variable). The first step of
calculating bitset_size is to set it to region_count, rounded up to a
multiple of BITS_PER_LONG. If region_size is less than BITS_PER_LONG
smaller than UINT_MAX, it will get rounded up to 2^32. On a 32bit
architecture, this will make bitset_size wrap around to 0 and fail,
despite region_count being valid.
Since bitset_size gets divided by 8, it can hold any valid region_count.
It just needs a special case to handle the rollover. If it is 0, the
value rolled over, and bitset size should be set to the number of bytes
needed to hold 2^32 bits. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv4: bound TCP reordering sysctl writes and MTU probe sizes
Reject invalid `net.ipv4.tcp_reordering` values before they reach TCP
socket state. The sysctl is stored as an `int` but copied into the
`u32` `tp->reordering` field for new sockets, so negative writes wrap
to large values.
With `tcp_mtu_probing=2`, the wrapped value can overflow the
`tcp_mtu_probe()` size calculation and drive the MTU probing path into
an out-of-bounds read. Route `tcp_reordering` writes through
`proc_dointvec_minmax()` and require it to be at least 1. Also require
`tcp_max_reordering` to be at least 1 so the configured maximum cannot
become negative either.
When registering the table for a non-init network namespace, relocate
`extra2` pointers that refer into `init_net.ipv4` so the
`tcp_reordering` upper bound follows that namespace's
`tcp_max_reordering`.
Harden `tcp_mtu_probe()` itself by computing `size_needed` as `u64`.
This keeps the send queue and window checks from being bypassed through
signed integer overflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ecc - Fix carry overflow in vli multiplication
The carry flag calculation fails when r01.m_high is saturated
(0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF) and addition of lower bits overflows.
The condition (r01.m_high < product.m_high) doesn't handle the case
where r01.m_high == product.m_high and an additional carry exists
from lower-bit overflow.
When commit 3c4b23901a0c ("crypto: ecdh - Add ECDH software support")
introduced crypto/ecc.c, it split the muladd() function in the
micro-ecc library into separate mul_64_64() and add_128_128() helpers.
It seems the check got lost in translation.
Add proper handling for this boundary by accounting for the carry
from the lower addition. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: rpl: fix hdrlen overflow in ipv6_rpl_srh_decompress()
ipv6_rpl_srh_decompress() computes:
outhdr->hdrlen = (((n + 1) * sizeof(struct in6_addr)) >> 3);
hdrlen is __u8. For n >= 127 the result exceeds 255 and silently
truncates. With n=127 (cmpri=15, cmpre=15, pad=0, hdrlen=16):
(128 * 16) >> 3 = 256, truncated to 0 as __u8
The caller in ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv() then places the compressed header
at buf + ((ohdr->hdrlen + 1) << 3). With hdrlen=0 this is buf + 8,
but the decompressed region occupies buf[0..2055] (8-byte header
plus 128 full addresses). The compressed header overlaps the
decompressed data, and ipv6_rpl_srh_compress() writes into this
overlap, corrupting the routing header of the forwarded packet.
The existing guard at exthdrs.c:546 checks (n + 1) > 255, which
prevents n+1 from overflowing unsigned char (the segments_left
field), but does not prevent the computed hdrlen from overflowing
__u8. n=127 passes because 128 <= 255, yet hdrlen=256 does not
fit.
Tighten the bound to (n + 1) > 127. This caps n at 126, giving
hdrlen = (127 * 16) >> 3 = 254, which fits in __u8. The compressed
header then lands at buf + ((254 + 1) << 3) = buf + 2040, exactly
past the decompressed region (buf[0..2039]). No overlap. 127
segments is well beyond any realistic RPL deployment. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Fix potential out-of-bounds access in ceph_handle_auth_reply()
This patch fixes an out-of-bounds access in ceph_handle_auth_reply()
that can be triggered by a message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY. In
ceph_handle_auth_reply(), the value of the payload_len field of such a
message is stored in a variable of type int. A value greater than
INT_MAX leads to an integer overflow and is interpreted as a negative
value. This leads to decrementing the pointer address by this value and
subsequently accessing it because ceph_decode_need() only checks that
the memory access does not exceed the end address of the allocation.
This patch fixes the issue by changing the data type of payload_len to
u32. Additionally, the data type of result_msg_len is changed to u32,
as it is also a variable holding a non-negative length.
Also, an additional layer of sanity checks is introduced, ensuring that
directly after reading it from the message, payload_len and
result_msg_len are not greater than the overall segment length.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811404df14 by task kworker/20:1/262
CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 262 Comm: kworker/20:1 Not tainted 6.19.2 #5 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn [libceph]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0
print_report+0xd1/0x620
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x72/0x210
kasan_report+0xe7/0x130
? ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]
? ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]
__asan_report_load_n_noabort+0xf/0x20
ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]
mon_dispatch+0x973/0x23d0 [libceph]
? apparmor_socket_recvmsg+0x6b/0xa0
? __pfx_mon_dispatch+0x10/0x10 [libceph]
? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30i
? mutex_unlock+0x7f/0xd0
? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_do_recvmsg+0x10/0x10 [libceph]
ceph_con_process_message+0x1f1/0x650 [libceph]
process_message+0x1e/0x450 [libceph]
ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x2e48/0x6c80 [libceph]
? __pfx_ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x10/0x10 [libceph]
? save_fpregs_to_fpstate+0xb0/0x230
? raw_spin_rq_unlock+0x17/0xa0
? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x13b/0x760
? __switch_to+0x385/0xda0
? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0
? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
ceph_con_workfn+0x248/0x10c0 [libceph]
process_one_work+0x629/0xf80
? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
worker_thread+0x87f/0x1570
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_try_to_wake_up+0x10/0x10
? kasan_print_address_stack_frame+0x1f7/0x280
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x396/0x830
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
? recalc_sigpending+0x180/0x210
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x3f7/0x610
? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
? __switch_to+0x385/0xda0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
[ idryomov: replace if statements with ceph_decode_need() for
payload_len and result_msg_len ] |
