| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/nouveau/dmem: fix callocated underflow on large folio split
nouveau_dmem_folio_free() drops chunk->callocated once per freed folio,
while a large (compound) device-private folio is only counted once when
it is allocated. When such a folio is split, the mm core invokes
->folio_split() (nouveau_dmem_folio_split()) once for each new
sub-folio, but the hook only fixes up the sub-folio metadata and leaves
chunk->callocated unchanged.
Each resulting sub-folio is later freed separately, so after a split
the single allocation (+1) is met by N frees (-N), leaving
chunk->callocated short by N-1. On the first split/free cycle it
underflows: WARN_ON(!chunk->callocated) fires, the unsigned counter
wraps and never returns to zero, so the chunk can no longer be
reclaimed (nouveau_dmem_fini() also warns on the leaked count).
Account for the new sub-folio in the split hook, under the same lock as
nouveau_dmem_folio_free(), so the count stays balanced. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memcg: bypass the reclaim and oom killer for dying tasks once oom_reaper is done
At Meta, we are seeing instances where an OOM killed job is stuck in the
exit path for several hours. In one particular case, the job was stuck
for more than 8 hours and I had to manually remove the memory.max limits
to allow the process to exit.
The job was a single process job and had ~55 GiB memory.max and zswap
enabled. It had almost 0 anon in memory and ~111 GiB in zswap compressed
to ~51 GiB zswap pool (i.e. almost all of memory.current was zswap).
Nothing was left on the LRUs to reclaim.
On further inspection, I observed ~20k threads of that process stuck with
the following stack:
[<0>] mem_cgroup_out_of_memory+0x4e/0xa0
[<0>] charge_memcg+0x8bf/0x990
[<0>] mem_cgroup_swapin_charge_folio+0x4e/0x80
[<0>] __read_swap_cache_async+0x10c/0x260
[<0>] swapin_readahead+0x116/0x3f0
[<0>] do_swap_page+0x13c/0x1ce0
[<0>] handle_mm_fault+0x61d/0x11f0
[<0>] do_user_addr_fault+0x3e7/0x6d0
[<0>] exc_page_fault+0x8f/0x110
[<0>] asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[<0>] __get_user_8+0x14/0x20
[<0>] futex_cleanup+0x27/0x1c0
[<0>] futex_exit_release+0x47/0x60
[<0>] do_exit+0x107/0x940
[<0>] do_group_exit+0x81/0xa0
[<0>] get_signal+0x2b1/0x6e0
[<0>] arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x1a/0x1c0
[<0>] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xa8/0x1c0
[<0>] do_syscall_64+0x152/0x250
[<0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
In addition the dmesg was filled with "Out of memory and no killable
processes..." messages.
I have no idea why oom reaper was not able to reap/unmap the process. My
guess is that since oom reaper tries to acquire mmap_lock in read mode
limited number of times and then gives up, there might be a thread of that
process which had mmap_lock in write mode at that time.
My initial suspicion was the futex_cleanup and kernel page fault causing
infinite fault and charge retries but that was put to rest in previous
discussions happened on similar problem [1].
My current theory is that it is just a simple slow serialization behind
the oom_lock. Unlike page allocator, memcg charge code takes the oom_lock
without the "try". Though memcg oom code uses mutex_lock_killable(), note
that in the call stack get_signal() consumes SIGKILL (or
sigdelset(SIGKILL)) before calling do_group_exit(). So this
mutex_lock_killable() is just a mutex_lock() here. Therefore 10s of
thousands of threads are waiting on oom_lock and one by one they get
-EFAULT from get_user() in the futex cleanup code and bails out.
Discussion from [1] led to commit a75ffa26122b ("memcg, oom: do not bypass
oom killer for dying tasks") which routes dying tasks into the OOM path
precisely so the oom_reaper can reap their mm and free the memory
asynchronously. But the reaper is best-effort and one-shot: if it cannot
take mmap_lock for read (e.g. a sibling thread holds it for write) it
sets MMF_OOM_SKIP and never retries, leaving only the glacial
oom_lock-serialized synchronous drain.
Once MMF_OOM_SKIP is set there is no more asynchronous reclaim coming for
the mm, so a dying task charging against it has nothing left to wait for:
it frees its memory only once it finishes exiting. Running reclaim and
the (no-victim) OOM killer for it is then pointless, and doing it for 10s
of thousands of exiting threads is what serializes them behind oom_lock.
So before reclaim, if current is an OOM victim whose reaper is done, fail
the charge.
Reproduced with 20k threads, each parking a robust futex head on its own
zswapped page, OOM-group-killed while a sibling holds mmap_lock for write
so the reaper gives up and sets MMF_OOM_SKIP. Tested on next-20260728 and
baseline show ~90 seconds exit time while with the patch the exit time
reduced to ~3 seconds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clocksource/drivers/timer-sun4i: Advertise a real minimum delta
sun4i_clkevt_next_event() compensates for the timer stop/start
synchronization delay by programming evt - TIMER_SYNC_TICKS into the
hardware interval register. The clockevent device currently advertises
TIMER_SYNC_TICKS as min_delta_ticks, so the clockevents core is allowed
to call set_next_event() with evt == TIMER_SYNC_TICKS.
That programs a zero-tick interval. With oneshot/highres/nohz timer
operation this can leave the next event stuck, which was observed as a
boot hang on Allwinner D1 after the clockevents core started reusing
forced minimum-delta events.
Advertise one extra tick instead, so the smallest event accepted by the
core still programs at least one hardware tick after the synchronization
compensation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: do not use make_bad_inode() in ocfs2_read_inode_block_full()
This reverts commit 58b6fcd2ab34 ("ocfs2: mark inode bad upon validation
failure during read").
Since 'make_bad_inode()' resets inode type to S_IFREG, doing this for
directory inode during active VFS lookup is likely to confuse the latter,
including VFS_BUG_ON_INODE() triggered in this case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Reject page faults from non-fault-mode scratch VMs
Having scratch enabled does not make a VM capable of handling recoverable
page faults. Allowing scratch VMs through the ASID lookup also admits
dma-fence mode VMs.
If such a VM faults on an already valid VMA, the handler reports success
without fixing the fault, causing the GPU to retry indefinitely.
Only allow fault-mode VMs through the ASID lookup. Fault-mode VMs using
scratch remain supported, while faults from 3D VMs are rejected.
(cherry picked from commit bfb24a06405b652d37831f3fb66b71d33a6605de) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: bound qdisc_pkt_len to prevent qdisc soft lockup
qdisc_get_stab() accepts a user-supplied size table, and
__qdisc_calculate_pkt_len() amplifies qdisc_pkt_len() through the
overhead, the size-table data (u16), and size_log (up to
STAB_SIZE_LOG_MAX). A crafted stab can therefore set qdisc_pkt_len()
to ~1 GiB for an ordinary skb. Per-flow deficit schedulers such as
DRR and ETS replenish one quantum per loop iteration; with a tiny
quantum (1) they spin billions of times under the qdisc lock,
producing a soft lockup / RCU stall as illustrated by vega@nebusec.ai.
Cap the final qdisc_pkt_len() to QDISC_PKT_LEN_MAX so the size-table
amplification cannot drive deficit schedulers into an unbounded loop.
A legitimate size table (e.g. qfq's overhead 999999999, which is
handled by dropping) is still accepted.
Introduce cap QDISC_PKT_LEN_MAX (1 << 20) = 1 MiB which is well above
any legitimate single-skb wire length: the largest current skb->len
is GSO_MAX_SIZE (524280), and an ATM-style size table (53/48 cell tax)
amplifies that to ~578 KB, both comfortably below 1 MiB. At the same
time, 1 MiB bounds the deficit refill loop to ~1M iterations per
packet with quantum=1, which completes in a few milliseconds well
under the demonstrated softlockup threshold (~10^9 iterations).
Conditions to recreate the bug:
- CONFIG_NET_SCHED=y, CONFIG_NET_SCH_DRR=y (or CONFIG_NET_SCH_ETS=y).
- Attach a DRR (or ETS) root qdisc with a crafted TCA_STAB that
amplifies qdisc_pkt_len to ~1 GiB (e.g. size_log=15, data=[32768]).
- Add a class with a tiny quantum of 1 and send one small packet; the
deficit loop spins billions of times under the qdisc lock and trips
the softlockup detector (panic with kernel.softlockup_panic=1).
- Reachable as root or from an unprivileged user in a fresh user+net
namespace (unshare -Urn) with namespace-local CAP_NET_ADMIN. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Mark tracing_multi trampolines as ftrace managed
Since tracing_multi link does not set ftrace_managed, it would fail to
release the tracing_multi link when attaching tracing_multi link and
then attaching fentry link.
[ 3.714215] WARNING: kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:1727 at bpf_trampoline_multi_detach+0x20b/0x240, CPU#1: test_progs/97
...
[ 3.733170] bpf_tracing_multi_link_release+0x14/0x30
[ 3.733890] bpf_link_free+0x58/0x130
[ 3.734414] bpf_link_release+0x23/0x30
Fix it by setting 'ftrace_managed = true' in register_fentry_multi(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thermal: intel: int3400: clean up ODVP on probe failures
evaluate_odvp() creates per-ODVP sysfs files before the thermal zone
and later probe resources are registered. The current unwind path only
calls cleanup_odvp() from the late sysfs failure path, so failures after
evaluate_odvp() but before that label, including
thermal_tripless_zone_device_register() failures, leave the ODVP files
and storage behind.
Move the ODVP cleanup to the common ART/TRT unwind path so every failure
after evaluate_odvp() releases the ODVP state. Also clear the cached
ODVP pointers in cleanup_odvp(), because evaluate_odvp() can already call
it for partial setup failures while probe continues. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7915: fix double hif2 init on the non-WED path
mt7915_pci_init_hif2() was called unconditionally and again inside the
WED-inactive branch. The helper increments the global hif_idx, writes the
PCIe RECOG_ID register and takes a get_device() reference via
mt7915_pci_get_hif2(), while removal only drops one reference. On non-WED
dual-hif hardware this double-incremented hif_idx, wrote RECOG_ID twice and
leaked a device reference. Only the call inside the WED-inactive branch is
correct; drop the unconditional one. hif2 is already initialised to NULL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched_ext: Abort directly from the hardlockup handler
scx_hardlockup() defers the abort to an irq_work because exit claiming used
to take scx_sched_lock and couldn't run from NMI. The deferral is now
unnecessary - claiming is NMI-safe and asserting ->aborting is exactly what
breaks the live-locks that hard-lock CPUs. Call handle_lockup() directly and
drop the irq_work. This also makes the self-detected case recoverable: the
perf watchdog fires on the hard-locked CPU itself, where a queued irq_work
never runs with IRQs off.
Also fix the return value: %true used to be returned whenever sched_ext was
loaded, suppressing the kernel's hardlockup report even when the abort was
refused. Return %true only when this call initiated the abort. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Disallow interpreter fallback for arena-related insns
Since the interpreter does not support the arena-related insns,
interpreter fallback should not be allowed for these insns in
core.c::__bpf_prog_select_runtime().
Currently, when the interpreter executes the arena ST/LDX/STX insns,
it would hit the BUG_ON() in ___bpf_prog_run() at run time.
[ 2.579196] BPF interpreter: unknown opcode a2 (imm: 0x0)
[ 2.579998] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 2.580652] kernel BUG at kernel/bpf/core.c:2349!
[ 2.581314] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
Set jit_required as true when arena map is used in the prog to disallow
interpreter fallback for arena-related insns. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: ipc4-topology: Return error for invalid number of formats
When the number of input or output formats is zero,
sof_ipc4_widget_setup_comp_src() and sof_ipc4_widget_setup_comp_asrc()
print an error and jump to the cleanup label. At that point 'ret' is
still 0, because the earlier sof_ipc4_get_audio_fmt() call succeeded, so
the function returns success and the caller never finds out that the
widget setup actually failed.
Set ret to -EINVAL before the goto so the error gets reported. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/rockchip: analogix_dp: Fix OF node reference leak via auto cleanup
Sashiko reported a reference leak in rockchip_dp_drm_encoder_enable(),
the of_get_child_by_name() function does not call of_node_put() in a
symmetrical way [1].
Fix the device node reference leak by using __free(device_node) to
automatically manage of_node_put() for all device nodes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memcg: move LRU size accounting on reparenting instead of copying it
When a memory cgroup is offlined its LRU folios are reparented to the
parent. lruvec_reparent_lru() splices the child's lists into the
parent's and credits the parent with the child's per-zone
lru_zone_size[], but never clears the child's copy, so the size is
copied rather than moved. lru_gen_reparent_memcg() does the same for
MGLRU.
The parent is left correct, credited with exactly the folios it took
over. The stale value sits on the child and nothing will correct it:
folio->memcg_data now resolves to the parent, so every later
update_lru_size() for those folios goes there.
Dying cgroups are not freed immediately and mem_cgroup_iter() still
walks them, so shrink_lruvec() keeps being called on them.
get_scan_count() reads the phantom counter through lruvec_lru_size() and
the scan loop then grinds through nr[] in SWAP_CLUSTER_MAX steps against
an empty list, for as long as the dead cgroup lives. Under MGLRU the
MGLRU scanner runs instead, but count_shadow_nodes() sums all of
NR_LRU_LISTS through lruvec_lru_size() and over-budgets the shadow node
limit just the same.
On one 251 GiB host a sweep of every mz->lru_zone_size[] found 380
counters describing folios on no list at all: 124777314 pages, 476 GiB,
1.89x the machine's RAM, across 57 cgroups. All were on memcgs with
CSS_DYING set and CSS_ONLINE clear, and parent/child pairs reported
byte-identical sizes.
LRU_UNEVICTABLE needs its size moved too. Its list is deliberately not
spliced because lruvec_init() poisons the head - the unevictable LRU is
imaginary and folios are never threaded on it - but the size is kept by
lruvec_add_folio()/lruvec_del_folio() and those folios account to the
parent from here on.
This depends on commit bf4ade7dbd76 ("memcg: keep folio's objcg same as
its node") and must not be backported ahead of it. Without that
invariant a folio's objcg can belong to another node, so a folio already
spliced onto the parent's list can still resolve to the child's lruvec
until the objcg's node is reparented in a later iteration of
memcg_reparent_objcgs(); clearing the child's counter early then lets
lruvec_del_folio() underflow it and trip the WARN_ONCE()/VM_BUG_ON() in
mem_cgroup_update_lru_size(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: RISC-V: Fix riscv_acpi_add_prt_dep() loop handling
The loop in riscv_acpi_add_prt_dep() includes error conditions that are
handled in a dubious - if not outright wrong - way, by continuining the
loop (which skips and misses the entry pointer update to point to the next
entry).
Rewrite the loop as a for loop (that handles the continuation correctly)
and wrap the condition and update statements using helper functions to make
it cleaner. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm: Fix task_struct reference leak in recover_worker
get_pid_task() increments the task reference count, but the
corresponding put_task_struct() was missing in the else branch,
leaking a reference on every GPU hang recovery.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/730662/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/cxgb4: Free debugfs on registration failure
c4iw_alloc() creates the per-device debugfs tree (dev->debugfs_root via
setup_debugfs()), but it is removed only in c4iw_remove(), not in
c4iw_dealloc(). When RDMA device registration fails, the registration
worker's err_dealloc_ctx path calls c4iw_dealloc() directly, bypassing
c4iw_remove(), so the debugfs dentries leak and outlive the freed
c4iw_dev.
Move debugfs_remove_recursive() into c4iw_dealloc() so every path that
frees ctx->dev also removes its debugfs tree. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: amd: isp4: release partial allocations in isp4if_alloc_fw_gpumem()
isp4if_alloc_fw_gpumem() allocates several GPU memory pools in sequence.
If one of them fails, it jumps to error_no_memory and returns -ENOMEM
without releasing the pools that were already allocated, leaking them.
Release the already-allocated pools before returning. isp4if_gpu_mem_free()
is a no-op on pools that were not allocated, so calling
isp4if_dealloc_fw_gpumem() here safely frees exactly the pools that
succeeded.
isp4if_gpu_mem_free() previously logged an error for a NULL entry, which
is a normal case during partial-allocation cleanup, so make it silent. |
| The AsyncHttpClient (AHC) library allows Java applications to easily execute HTTP requests and asynchronously process HTTP responses. From 3.0.8 until 3.0.12, processScramAuthenticationInfo and processAuthenticationInfo compute the SCRAM ServerSignature or Digest rspauth verification result but log a mismatch and still deliver the response as authenticated. On a non-TLS or compromised transport, a peer that has not proved knowledge of the shared secret can therefore be accepted as the server. The fix rejects a present invalid value and computes Digest rspauth from the Authorization parameters actually sent, but verification remains unenforced when the value is absent, the sent parameters cannot be recovered, or Digest uses qop=auth-int. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.12. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix valid block count leak on data block allocation failure
In __allocate_data_block(), when allocating a new data block
(dn->data_blkaddr == NULL_ADDR), inc_valid_block_count() is
called first to increment total_valid_block_count and i_blocks.
If the subsequent f2fs_allocate_data_block() fails, the function
returns the error directly without rolling back the
already-incremented block counts, causing a permanent leak.
Fix this by calling dec_valid_block_count() to undo the
increment before returning the error. The condition
old_blkaddr == NULL_ADDR precisely identifies the case where
inc_valid_block_count() was called. |
