| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mwifiex: bound uAP association event IEs to the event buffer
mwifiex_process_uap_event() handles EVENT_UAP_STA_ASSOC by exposing the
(re)association request IEs that the firmware copies into the event:
sinfo->assoc_req_ies = &event->data[len];
len = (u8 *)sinfo->assoc_req_ies - (u8 *)&event->frame_control;
sinfo->assoc_req_ies_len = le16_to_cpu(event->len) - (u16)len;
event->len is supplied by the device firmware and is never validated,
and the subtraction is unchecked. assoc_req_ies points into
adapter->event_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE], a fixed-size array embedded in the
kmalloc()'d struct mwifiex_adapter.
On the ap_11n_enabled path mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap() walks these IEs with
cfg80211_find_ie(), whose for_each_element() loop dereferences each
element header. A firmware-reported event->len larger than the bytes
actually received makes assoc_req_ies_len describe IEs that extend past
event_body, so the walk reads out of the adapter slab object, a
slab-out-of-bounds read (KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_find_ie).
An event->len smaller than the header instead makes the int subtraction
negative, which wraps to a huge size_t when stored in assoc_req_ies_len.
The same length is handed to cfg80211_new_sta(), so a more modest
over-claim can also copy stale event_body bytes into the
NL80211_CMD_NEW_STATION notification.
A malicious or malfunctioning mwifiex device (USB/SDIO/PCIe) can deliver
such an event while the interface is in AP/uAP mode.
Validate event->len before use: reject a length that underflows the
header or that would place the IEs outside the event_body[] buffer the
event was copied into. event->len here is struct mwifiex_assoc_event.len,
a payload field internal to this event, not the transport frame length,
so it is validated in this handler rather than at the generic
MWIFIEX_TYPE_EVENT receive path, which only sees the event cause and the
transport frame length. The bound is against event_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE]
rather than the actually-received length because the transports store the
event differently (USB and SDIO leave the 4-byte event header in
event_skb, PCIe strips it via skb_pull), whereas event_body is the single
fixed buffer all of them copy the event into. This is the event-path
analogue of the receive-path bounds checks added in commit 119585281617
("wifi: mwifiex: Fix OOB and integer underflow when rx packets"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: reject free space cache with more entries than pages
When loading a v1 free space cache, __load_free_space_cache() takes
num_entries and num_bitmaps straight from the on-disk
btrfs_free_space_header. That header is stored in the tree_root under a key
with type 0, which the tree-checker has no case for, so neither count is
validated before the load trusts it.
The load loops num_entries times and maps the next page whenever the current
one runs out, going through io_ctl_check_crc() -> io_ctl_map_page(), which
does io_ctl->pages[io_ctl->index++]. But pages[] is allocated in
io_ctl_init() from the cache inode's i_size, not from num_entries:
num_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(i_size_read(inode), PAGE_SIZE);
io_ctl->pages = kcalloc(num_pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_NOFS);
So if num_entries claims more records than the pages can hold, io_ctl->index
runs off the end of pages[]. The write side never hits this because
io_ctl_add_entry() and io_ctl_add_bitmap() both stop once
io_ctl->index >= io_ctl->num_pages; the read side just never had the same
check.
To trigger it, take a clean cache (num_entries = <N> here), set num_entries
in the header to 0x10000, and fix up the leaf checksum so it still passes
the tree-checker. The cache inode has i_size = 65536, so num_pages is 16 and
pages[] is a 16-pointer (kmalloc-128) array. The load now tries to read
65536 entries, io_ctl->index walks up to 16, and pages[16] is read past the
array:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in io_ctl_check_crc (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:420 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:565)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800c833a80 by task kworker/u8:3/58
io_ctl_check_crc (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:420 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:565)
__load_free_space_cache (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:655 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:820)
load_free_space_cache (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:1017)
caching_thread (fs/btrfs/block-group.c:880)
btrfs_work_helper (fs/btrfs/async-thread.c:312)
process_one_work
worker_thread
kthread
ret_from_fork
free-space-cache.c:420 is io_ctl_map_page(), inlined into io_ctl_check_crc()
at line 565, which is why that is the frame KASAN names. The out-of-bounds
slot is then treated as a struct page and handed to crc32c(), so the bad
read turns into a GP fault.
Add the missing check to io_ctl_check_crc(), which is where both the entry
loop and the bitmap loop end up. When num_entries is too large the load now
fails like any corrupt cache: __load_free_space_cache() drops it and rebuilds
the free space from the extent tree, so a valid cache is never rejected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usbnet: gl620a: fix out-of-bounds read in genelink_rx_fixup()
genelink_rx_fixup() splits an aggregated RX frame into its individual
packets, using a per-packet length taken from device-supplied data. That
length is only bounded by GL_MAX_PACKET_LEN (1514); it is never compared
against how many bytes were actually received.
A malicious GeneLink (GL620A) device can therefore send a short URB whose
header claims packet_count > 1 and a first packet of up to 1514 bytes.
skb_put_data(gl_skb, packet->packet_data, size);
then copies past the end of the receive buffer and hands the adjacent slab
contents up the network stack, an out-of-bounds read that leaks kernel heap.
No privilege is required: the path runs in the usbnet RX softirq as soon as
the interface is up.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in genelink_rx_fixup (drivers/net/usb/gl620a.c:112)
Read of size 1514 at addr ffff888011309708 by task ksoftirqd/0/14
Call Trace:
...
__asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105)
genelink_rx_fixup (include/linux/skbuff.h:2814 drivers/net/usb/gl620a.c:112)
usbnet_bh (drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:572 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1589)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322)
bh_worker (kernel/workqueue.c:3405)
tasklet_action (kernel/softirq.c:965)
handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622)
run_ksoftirqd (kernel/softirq.c:1076)
...
skb_pull() already verifies that the requested length fits the buffer and
returns NULL otherwise. Move it ahead of the copy and check its result, so
a packet that overruns the received data is rejected before it is read.
Well-formed frames, whose packets are fully present, are unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in is_ap_in_tkip() IE loop
The loop in is_ap_in_tkip() iterates over IEs without verifying that
enough bytes remain before dereferencing the IE header or its payload:
- pIE->element_id and pIE->length are read without checking that
i + sizeof(*pIE) <= ie_length, so a truncated IE at the end of the
buffer causes an OOB read.
- For WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC the code compares pIE->data + 12,
which requires pIE->length >= 16. For WLAN_EID_RSN it compares
pIE->data + 8, requiring pIE->length >= 12. Neither requirement
is checked.
Add the missing IE header and payload bounds checks and guard each
data access with an explicit pIE->length minimum, matching the
pattern established in update_beacon_info(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwrng: virtio: clamp device-reported used.len at copy_data()
random_recv_done() stores the device-reported used.len directly into
vi->data_avail. copy_data() then indexes vi->data[] using
vi->data_idx (advanced by previous copy_data() calls) and issues a
memcpy() without re-validating either value against the posted
buffer size sizeof(vi->data) (SMP_CACHE_BYTES bytes, typically 32
or 64).
A malicious or buggy virtio-rng backend can set used.len beyond
sizeof(vi->data), steering the memcpy() past the end of the inline
array into adjacent kmalloc-1k slab bytes. hwrng_fillfn() mixes
those bytes into the guest RNG, and guest root can also observe
them directly via /dev/hwrng.
Concrete impact is inside the guest:
- Memory-safety / hardening: any virtio-rng backend that
over-reports used.len causes the driver to read past vi->data
into unrelated slab contents. hwrng_fillfn() is a kernel thread
that runs as soon as the device is probed; no guest userspace
interaction is required to first-trigger the OOB.
- Cross-boundary leak (confidential-compute threat model): a
malicious hypervisor cooperating with a malicious or compromised
guest root userspace can use /dev/hwrng as a leak channel for
guest-kernel heap data. The host sets a large used.len, guest
root reads /dev/hwrng, and the returned bytes contain guest
kernel slab contents that were adjacent to vi->data. In
practice, confidential-compute guests (SEV-SNP, TDX) usually
disable virtio-rng entirely, so this path is narrow, but the
fix is still worth carrying because the underlying
memory-safety bug contaminates the guest RNG on any host.
KASAN confirms the OOB on a 7.1-rc4 guest whose virtio-rng backend
has been patched to report used.len = 0x10000:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0
Read of size 64 at addr ffff88800ae0ba20 by task hwrng/52
Call Trace:
__asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60
virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0
hwrng_fillfn+0xb2/0x470
kthread+0x2cc/0x3a0
Allocated by task 1:
probe_common+0xa5/0x660
virtio_dev_probe+0x549/0xbc0
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800ae0b800
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 544-byte region [ffff88800ae0b800, ffff88800ae0ba20)
Same class of bug as commit c04db81cd028 ("net/9p: Fix buffer
overflow in USB transport layer"), which hardened
usb9pfs_rx_complete() against unchecked device-reported length in
the USB 9p transport.
With the clamp at point of use and array_index_nospec() in place,
the same harness boots cleanly: copy_data() returns zero for the
bogus report, the device-supplied bytes after data_idx are
discarded, and the driver issues a fresh request. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix out-of-bounds read in broadcast Gap ACK blocks
A broadcast PROTOCOL/STATE_MSG can carry a Gap ACK blocks record in its
data area. tipc_get_gap_ack_blks() only verifies that the record's len
field is self-consistent with its ugack_cnt/bgack_cnt counts
(sz == struct_size(p, gacks, ugack_cnt + bgack_cnt)); it does not check
that the record actually fits in the message data area, msg_data_sz().
The unicast caller tipc_link_proto_rcv() bounds it ("if (glen > dlen)
break;"), but the broadcast caller tipc_bcast_sync_rcv() discards the
returned size, so tipc_link_advance_transmq() copies the record off the
receive skb with an attacker-controlled count:
this_ga = kmemdup(ga, struct_size(ga, gacks, ga->bgack_cnt),
GFP_ATOMIC);
A TIPC neighbour that negotiated TIPC_GAP_ACK_BLOCK triggers it with one
ordinary broadcast STATE_MSG (msg_bc_ack_invalid() clear), sized so its
data area is short, carrying a Gap ACK record with len = 0x400,
bgack_cnt = 0xff and ugack_cnt = 0. len then equals
struct_size(p, gacks, 255), so the consistency check passes and ga is
non-NULL; kmemdup() reads struct_size(ga, gacks, 255) = 1024 bytes out
of the much smaller skb:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x48/0x60
Read of size 1024 at addr ffff0000c7030d38 by task poc864/69
Call trace:
kmemdup_noprof+0x48/0x60
tipc_link_advance_transmq+0x86c/0xb80
tipc_link_bc_ack_rcv+0x19c/0x1e0
tipc_bcast_sync_rcv+0x1c4/0x2c4
tipc_rcv+0x85c/0x1340
tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0xac/0x104
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0000c7030d00
which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704
The buggy address is located 56 bytes inside of
allocated 704-byte region [ffff0000c7030d00, ffff0000c7030fc0)
The copied-out bytes are subsequently consumed as gap/ack values, but
the read is already out of bounds at the kmemdup() regardless of how
they are used.
The unicast STATE path drops such a message: "if (glen > dlen) break;"
skips the rest of STATE_MSG handling and the skb is freed. Make the
broadcast path drop it too. tipc_bcast_sync_rcv() now bounds the record
against msg_data_sz() and, when it does not fit, reports it back through
tipc_node_bc_sync_rcv() to tipc_rcv() so the skb is discarded rather than
processed. ga is not cleared on this path: ga == NULL already means
"legacy peer without Selective ACK", a distinct legitimate state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: restrict implied bcc[0] exemption to responses without data area
smb2_check_message() has a long-standing quirk that accepts a response
whose calculated length is one byte larger than the bytes actually
received ("server can return one byte more due to implied bcc[0]").
This was introduced to accommodate servers that omit the trailing bcc[0]
overlap byte when no data area is present.
However, the exemption is applied unconditionally, regardless of whether
the command actually carries a data area (has_smb2_data_area[]). When a
response with a data area is subject to the +1 exemption, the reported
data can extend one byte beyond the bytes actually received, yet
smb2_check_message() still accepts it. The subsequent decoder then reads
past the end of the receive buffer. This is reachable during NEGOTIATE
and SESSION_SETUP, before the session is established.
The resulting out-of-bounds reads are visible under KASAN when mounting
against a non-conforming server; both the SPNEGO/negTokenInit and the
NTLMSSP challenge decoders are affected:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in asn1_ber_decoder+0x16a7/0x1b00
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880084d67c0 by task mount.cifs/81
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 81 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6 #1
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70
print_report+0x157/0x4c9
kasan_report+0xce/0x100
asn1_ber_decoder+0x16a7/0x1b00
decode_negTokenInit+0x19/0x30
SMB2_negotiate+0x31d9/0x4c90
cifs_negotiate_protocol+0x1f2/0x3f0
cifs_get_smb_ses+0x93f/0x17e0
cifs_mount_get_session+0x7f/0x3a0
cifs_mount+0xb4/0xcf0
cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x23a/0x1500
smb3_get_tree+0x3b0/0x630
vfs_get_tree+0x82/0x2d0
fc_mount+0x10/0x1b0
path_mount+0x50d/0x1de0
__x64_sys_mount+0x20b/0x270
do_syscall_64+0xee/0x590
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
Allocated by task 85:
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x106/0x380
mempool_alloc_noprof+0x116/0x1e0
cifs_small_buf_get+0x31/0x80
allocate_buffers+0x10d/0x2b0
cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x1d5/0x1d50
kthread+0x2c6/0x390
ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 448-byte region [ffff8880084d6600, ffff8880084d67c0)
which belongs to the cache cifs_small_rq of size 448
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x36/0x50
Read of size 329 at addr ffff88800726c678 by task mount.cifs/89
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 89 Comm: mount.cifs Tainted: G B 7.1.0-rc6 #1
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70
print_report+0x157/0x4c9
kasan_report+0xce/0x100
kasan_check_range+0x10f/0x1e0
__asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60
kmemdup_noprof+0x36/0x50
decode_ntlmssp_challenge+0x457/0x680
SMB2_sess_auth_rawntlmssp_negotiate+0x6f0/0xcb0
SMB2_sess_setup+0x219/0x4f0
cifs_setup_session+0x248/0xaf0
cifs_get_smb_ses+0xf79/0x17e0
cifs_mount_get_session+0x7f/0x3a0
cifs_mount+0xb4/0xcf0
cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x23a/0x1500
smb3_get_tree+0x3b0/0x630
vfs_get_tree+0x82/0x2d0
fc_mount+0x10/0x1b0
path_mount+0x50d/0x1de0
__x64_sys_mount+0x20b/0x270
do_syscall_64+0xee/0x590
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
Allocated by task 93:
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x106/0x380
mempool_alloc_noprof+0x116/0x1e0
cifs_small_buf_get+0x31/0x80
allocate_buffers+0x10d/0x2b0
cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x1d5/0x1d50
kthread+0x2c6/0x390
ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
The buggy address is located 120 bytes inside of
allocated 448-byte region [ffff88800726c600, ffff88800726c7c0)
which belongs to the cache cifs_small_rq of size 448
Restrict the +1 exemption to responses that have no data area, so that
it still covers the bcc[0] omission it was meant for. When a data area
is present, the +1 discrepancy instead means the reported data length
overruns the
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix WEP length underflow and OOB read in OnAuth()
OnAuth() has two bugs in the shared-key authentication path.
When the Privacy bit is set, rtw_wep_decrypt() is called without
verifying that the frame is long enough to contain a valid WEP IV and
ICV. Inside rtw_wep_decrypt(), length is computed as:
length = len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - iv_len
and then passed as (length - 4) to crc32_le(). If len is less than
WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + iv_len + icv_len (32 bytes), length - 4 is negative
and, after the implicit cast to size_t, causes crc32_le() to read far
beyond the frame buffer. Add a minimum length check before accessing
the IV field and calling the decryption path.
When processing a seq=3 response, rtw_get_ie() stores the Challenge
Text IE length in ie_len, but the subsequent memcmp() always reads 128
bytes regardless of ie_len. IEEE 802.11 mandates a challenge text of
exactly 128 bytes; reject any IE whose length field differs, matching
the check already applied to OnAuthClient(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in OnAssocRsp() IE loop
The IE parsing loop in OnAssocRsp() advances by (pIE->length + 2) each
iteration but only guards on i < pkt_len. When a malicious AP sends an
AssocResponse whose last IE has only one byte remaining in the frame
(the element_id byte lands at pkt_len-1), the loop reads pIE->length
from pframe[pkt_len], which is one byte past the allocated receive buffer.
Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length
itself can extend the data window beyond pkt_len, silently passing a
truncated IE to the handler functions.
Add two guards at the top of the loop body:
1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can't read header).
2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past pkt_len. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in update_beacon_info() IE loop
The IE parsing loop in update_beacon_info() advances by
(pIE->length + 2) each iteration but only guards on i < len.
When a malicious AP sends a Beacon whose last IE has only one byte
remaining in the frame (the element_id byte lands at len-1), the loop
reads pIE->length from one byte past the allocated receive buffer.
Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length
itself can extend the data window beyond len, passing a truncated IE
to the handler functions.
Add two guards at the top of the loop body:
1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can't read header).
2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past len.
Also replace i += (pIE->length + 2) with i += sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length
for consistency with the sizeof(*pIE) guards added above. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in IE loops in issue_assocreq() and join_cmd_hdl()
Two IE parsing loops are missing the header bounds checks before they
dereference pIE->length:
- issue_assocreq() walks pmlmeinfo->network.ies to build the
association request. If the stored IE data ends with only an
element_id byte and no length byte, pIE->length is read one byte
past the end of the buffer.
- join_cmd_hdl() walks pnetwork->ies during station join and has
the same problem under the same conditions.
Both buffers are filled from AP beacon and probe-response frames, so a
malicious AP that sends a truncated final IE can trigger the issue.
Apply the two-guard pattern established in update_beacon_info():
1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain.
2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past the buffer end. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in rtw_get_sec_ie(), rtw_get_wapi_ie(), and rtw_get_wps_attr()
Three IE/attribute parsing functions have missing bounds checks.
rtw_get_sec_ie() and rtw_get_wapi_ie() iterate over a raw IE buffer
without verifying that the header bytes (tag + length) are within the
remaining buffer before reading them. Additionally, rtw_get_sec_ie()
compares the 4-byte WPA OUI at cnt+2 without checking that at least
6 bytes remain, and rtw_get_wapi_ie() compares a 4-byte WAPI OUI at
cnt+6 without checking that at least 10 bytes remain.
rtw_get_wps_attr() reads wps_ie[0] and wps_ie+2 unconditionally at
entry, before verifying that wps_ielen is large enough to contain
the 6-byte WPS IE header (element_id + length + 4-byte OUI). Inside
the attribute loop, get_unaligned_be16() is called on attr_ptr and
attr_ptr+2 without checking that 4 bytes remain in the buffer.
Add a cnt+2 bounds check before each loop body in rtw_get_sec_ie()
and rtw_get_wapi_ie(), guard each multi-byte comparison with a minimum
IE length requirement, add a wps_ielen < 6 early return in
rtw_get_wps_attr(), and add a 4-byte bounds check in its inner loop. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ebtables: module names must be null-terminated
We need to explicitly check the length, else we may pass non-null
terminated string to request_module(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ebtables: terminate table name before find_table_lock()
update_counters() and compat_update_counters() forward a user-supplied
32-byte table name to find_table_lock() without NUL-terminating it. On a
lookup miss, find_inlist_lock() calls try_then_request_module(..., "%s%s",
"ebtable_", name), and vsnprintf() reads past the name field and the
stack object until it hits a zero byte.
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in string (lib/vsprintf.c:648 lib/vsprintf.c:730)
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880119dfb20 by task exploit/147
Call Trace:
...
string (lib/vsprintf.c:648 lib/vsprintf.c:730)
vsnprintf (lib/vsprintf.c:2945)
__request_module (kernel/module/kmod.c:150)
do_update_counters.isra.0 (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:371 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:380)
update_counters (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:1440)
do_ebt_set_ctl (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2573)
nf_setsockopt (net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101)
ip_setsockopt (net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1424)
raw_setsockopt (net/ipv4/raw.c:847)
__sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2393)
...
compat_do_replace() shares the same unterminated name via
compat_copy_ebt_replace_from_user(); terminate it there too so all
find_table_lock() callers behave alike. The other callers already
terminate the name after the copy. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: validate VAT header length against the VAT inode size
udf_load_vat() takes the virtual partition's start offset straight from
the on-disk VAT 2.0 header without checking it against the VAT inode
size:
map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset =
le16_to_cpu(vat20->lengthHeader);
map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_num_entries =
(sbi->s_vat_inode->i_size -
map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset) >> 2;
lengthHeader is a fully attacker-controlled 16-bit value. If it exceeds
the VAT inode size, the s_num_entries subtraction underflows to a huge
count, which defeats the "block > s_num_entries" bound in
udf_get_pblock_virt15(); and on the ICB-inline path that function reads
((__le32 *)(iinfo->i_data + s_start_offset))[block]
so a large s_start_offset indexes past the inode's in-ICB data. Mounting
a crafted UDF image with a virtual (VAT) partition then triggers an
out-of-bounds read.
Reject a VAT whose header length does not leave room for at least one
entry within the VAT inode. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: validate sparing table length as an entry count, not a byte count
udf_load_sparable_map() accepts a sparing table when
sizeof(*st) + le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen) > sb->s_blocksize
is false, i.e. it treats reallocationTableLen as a number of BYTES that
must fit in the block. But the table is walked as an array of 8-byte
sparingEntry elements:
for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen); i++) {
struct sparingEntry *entry = &st->mapEntry[i];
... entry->origLocation ...
}
in udf_get_pblock_spar15() and udf_relocate_blocks(). A
reallocationTableLen of N therefore passes the check whenever
sizeof(*st) + N <= blocksize, yet the consumers index
sizeof(*st) + N * sizeof(struct sparingEntry) bytes -- up to ~8x the
block. On a crafted UDF image this is an out-of-bounds read in
udf_get_pblock_spar15(); udf_relocate_blocks() additionally feeds the
same length to udf_update_tag(), whose crc_itu_t() reads far past the
block, and its memmove() through st->mapEntry[] is an out-of-bounds
write.
Validate reallocationTableLen as the entry count it is, with
struct_size(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against transfer length
nvmet_auth_reply() accesses the variable-length rval[] array using
attacker-controlled hl (hash length) and dhvlen (DH value length) fields
without verifying they fit within the allocated buffer of tl bytes.
A malicious NVMe-oF initiator can craft a DHCHAP_REPLY message with a
small transfer length but large hl/dhvlen values, causing out-of-bounds
heap reads when the target processes the DH public key (rval + 2*hl) or
performs the host response memcmp.
With DH authentication configured, the OOB pointer is passed directly to
sg_init_one() and read by crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(), reaching
up to 526 bytes past the buffer. This is exploitable pre-authentication.
Add bounds validation ensuring sizeof(*data) + 2*hl + dhvlen <= tl before
any access to the variable-length fields.
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
isofs: bound Rock Ridge symlink components to the SL record
get_symlink_chunk() and the SL handling in
parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal() walk the variable-length components of
a Rock Ridge "SL" (symbolic link) record. Each component is a two-byte
header (flags, len) followed by len bytes of text, so it occupies
slp->len + 2 bytes. Both loops read slp->len and advance to the next
component, and get_symlink_chunk() additionally does
memcpy(rpnt, slp->text, slp->len), but neither checks that the component
lies within the SL record before dereferencing it.
A crafted SL record whose component declares a len that runs past the
record (rr->len) therefore triggers an out-of-bounds read of up to 255
bytes. When the record sits at the tail of its backing buffer - for
example a small kmalloc()ed continuation block reached through a CE
record - the read crosses the allocation; get_symlink_chunk() then
copies the out-of-bounds bytes into the symlink body returned to user
space by readlink(), disclosing adjacent kernel memory.
ISO 9660 images are routinely mounted from untrusted removable media -
desktop environments auto-mount them (e.g. via udisks2) without
CAP_SYS_ADMIN - so the record contents are attacker-controlled.
Reject any component that does not fit in the remaining record bytes
before using it. In get_symlink_chunk() return NULL, like the existing
output-buffer (plimit) checks, so a malformed record makes readlink()
fail with -EIO rather than silently returning a truncated target; in
parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal() stop the inode-size walk. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Prevent out-of-bounds read in glob matching
String event fields are not necessarily NUL-terminated, so the filter
predicate functions (filter_pred_string(), filter_pred_strloc() and
filter_pred_strrelloc()) pass the field length to the regex match
callbacks, and the length-aware matchers honour it.
regex_match_glob() was the exception: it ignored the length and called
glob_match(), which scans the string until it hits a NUL byte. Some
string fields are not NUL-terminated. One example is the dynamic char
array of the xfs_* namespace tracepoints, which is copied without a
trailing NUL. For such a field, glob matching reads past the end of
the event field, causing a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read in
glob_match(), reached via regex_match_glob() and filter_match_preds()
from the xfs_lookup tracepoint.
Add a length-bounded glob_match_len() and use it from regex_match_glob()
so glob matching always stops at the field boundary. The matching loop
is factored into a shared helper so glob_match() keeps its behaviour. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Bound used_lrs when flushing the pKVM hyp vCPU
flush_hyp_vcpu() copies the host vGIC state into the hyp's private vCPU
on every run. The vGIC list register save and restore use used_lrs as
their loop bound and expect it to stay within the number of implemented
list registers. While this is generally the case, flush_hyp_vcpu()
copies vgic_v3 verbatim and does not enforce this, so a value provided
by the host is used at EL2 to index vgic_lr[] and access ICH_LR<n>_EL2
(host -> EL2).
Fix by clamping used_lrs to the number of implemented list registers
after the copy, as the trusted path already does in
vgic_flush_lr_state(). The number of implemented list registers is
constant after init, so it is replicated once from
kvm_vgic_global_state.nr_lr into hyp_gicv3_nr_lr rather than read on
every entry. |
