| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fsnotify: fix inode reference leak in fsnotify_recalc_mask()
fsnotify_recalc_mask() fails to handle the return value of
__fsnotify_recalc_mask(), which may return an inode pointer that needs
to be released via fsnotify_drop_object() when the connector's HAS_IREF
flag transitions from set to cleared.
This manifests as a hung task with the following call trace:
INFO: task umount:1234 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
Call Trace:
__schedule
schedule
fsnotify_sb_delete
generic_shutdown_super
kill_anon_super
cleanup_mnt
task_work_run
do_exit
do_group_exit
The race window that triggers the iref leak:
Thread A (adding mark) Thread B (removing mark)
────────────────────── ────────────────────────
fsnotify_add_mark_locked():
fsnotify_add_mark_list():
spin_lock(conn->lock)
add mark_B(evictable) to list
spin_unlock(conn->lock)
return
/* ---- gap: no lock held ---- */
fsnotify_detach_mark(mark_A):
spin_lock(mark_A->lock)
clear ATTACHED flag on mark_A
spin_unlock(mark_A->lock)
fsnotify_put_mark(mark_A)
fsnotify_recalc_mask():
spin_lock(conn->lock)
__fsnotify_recalc_mask():
/* mark_A skipped: ATTACHED cleared */
/* only mark_B(evictable) remains */
want_iref = false
has_iref = true /* not yet cleared */
-> HAS_IREF transitions true -> false
-> returns inode pointer
spin_unlock(conn->lock)
/* BUG: return value discarded!
* iput() and fsnotify_put_sb_watched_objects()
* are never called */
Fix this by deferring the transition true -> false of HAS_IREF flag from
fsnotify_recalc_mask() (Thread A) to fsnotify_put_mark() (thread B). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tap: fix stack info leak in tap_ioctl() SIOCGIFHWADDR
In the SIOCGIFHWADDR path, tap_ioctl() copies 16 bytes of an
uninitialised on-stack struct sockaddr_storage to userspace via
ifr_hwaddr, but netif_get_mac_address() only writes sa_family and
dev->addr_len (6 for Ethernet) bytes, leaving sa_data[6..13] uninitialised.
Those 8 trailing bytes leak kernel stack contents; SIOCGIFHWADDR on a
macvtap chardev returns kernel .text and direct-map pointers, defeating
KASLR.
Initialise ss at declaration. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "net/smc: Introduce TCP ULP support"
This reverts commit d7cd421da9da2cc7b4d25b8537f66db5c8331c40.
As reported by Al Viro, the TCP ULP support for SMC is fundamentally
broken. The implementation attempts to convert an active TCP socket
into an SMC socket by modifying the underlying `struct file`, dentry,
and inode in-place, which violates core VFS invariants that assume
these structures are immutable for an open file, creating a risk of
use after free errors and general system instability.
Given the severity of this design flaw and the fact that cleaner
alternatives (e.g., LD_PRELOAD, BPF) exist for legacy application
transparency, the correct course of action is to remove this feature
entirely. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix fsck inconsistency caused by FGGC of node block
During FGGC node block migration, fsck may incorrectly treat the
migrated node block as fsync-written data.
The reproduction scenario:
root@vm:/mnt/f2fs# seq 1 2048 | xargs -n 1 ./test_sync // write inline inode and sync
root@vm:/mnt/f2fs# rm -f 1
root@vm:/mnt/f2fs# sync
root@vm:/mnt/f2fs# f2fs_io gc_range // move data block in sync mode and not write CP
SPO, "fsck --dry-run" find inode has already checkpointed but still
with DENT_BIT_SHIFT set
The root cause is that GC does not clear the dentry mark and fsync mark
during node block migration, leading fsck to misinterpret them as
user-issued fsync writes.
In BGGC mode, node block migration is handled by f2fs_sync_node_pages(),
which guarantees the dentry and fsync marks are cleared before writing.
This patch move the set/clear of the fsync|dentry marks into
__write_node_folio to make the logic clearer, and ensures the
fsync|dentry mark is cleared in FGGC. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gfs2: Fix slab-use-after-free in qd_put
Commit a475c5dd16e5 ("gfs2: Free quota data objects synchronously")
started freeing quota data objects during filesystem shutdown instead of
putting them back onto the LRU list, but it failed to remove these
objects from the LRU list, causing LRU list corruption. This caused
use-after-free when the shrinker (gfs2_qd_shrink_scan) tried to access
already-freed objects on the LRU list.
Fix this by removing qd objects from the LRU list before freeing them in
qd_put().
Initial fix from Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: RX, Fix XDP multi-buf frag counting for striding RQ
XDP multi-buf programs can modify the layout of the XDP buffer when the
program calls bpf_xdp_pull_data() or bpf_xdp_adjust_tail(). The
referenced commit in the fixes tag corrected the assumption in the mlx5
driver that the XDP buffer layout doesn't change during a program
execution. However, this fix introduced another issue: the dropped
fragments still need to be counted on the driver side to avoid page
fragment reference counting issues.
The issue was discovered by the drivers/net/xdp.py selftest,
more specifically the test_xdp_native_tx_mb:
- The mlx5 driver allocates a page_pool page and initializes it with
a frag counter of 64 (pp_ref_count=64) and the internal frag counter
to 0.
- The test sends one packet with no payload.
- On RX (mlx5e_skb_from_cqe_mpwrq_nonlinear()), mlx5 configures the XDP
buffer with the packet data starting in the first fragment which is the
page mentioned above.
- The XDP program runs and calls bpf_xdp_pull_data() which moves the
header into the linear part of the XDP buffer. As the packet doesn't
contain more data, the program drops the tail fragment since it no
longer contains any payload (pp_ref_count=63).
- mlx5 device skips counting this fragment. Internal frag counter
remains 0.
- mlx5 releases all 64 fragments of the page but page pp_ref_count is
63 => negative reference counting error.
Resulting splat during the test:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 188225 at ./include/net/page_pool/helpers.h:297 mlx5e_page_release_fragmented.isra.0+0xbd/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
Modules linked in: [...]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 188225 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.18.0-rc7_for_upstream_min_debug_2025_12_08_11_44 #1 NONE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_page_release_fragmented.isra.0+0xbd/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mlx5e_free_rx_mpwqe+0x20a/0x250 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_dealloc_rx_mpwqe+0x37/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_free_rx_descs+0x11a/0x170 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_close_rq+0x78/0xa0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_close_queues+0x46/0x2a0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_close_channel+0x24/0x90 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_close_channels+0x5d/0xf0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_safe_switch_params+0x2ec/0x380 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_change_mtu+0x11d/0x490 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_change_nic_mtu+0x19/0x30 [mlx5_core]
netif_set_mtu_ext+0xfc/0x240
do_setlink.isra.0+0x226/0x1100
rtnl_newlink+0x7a9/0xba0
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x220/0x3c0
netlink_rcv_skb+0x4b/0xf0
netlink_unicast+0x255/0x380
netlink_sendmsg+0x1f3/0x420
__sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60
____sys_sendmsg+0x1e8/0x240
___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xb0
[...]
__sys_sendmsg+0x5f/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x55/0xc70
The problem applies for XDP_PASS as well which is handled in a different
code path in the driver.
This patch fixes the issue by doing page frag counting on all the
original XDP buffer fragments for all relevant XDP actions (XDP_TX ,
XDP_REDIRECT and XDP_PASS). This is basically reverting to the original
counting before the commit in the fixes tag.
As frag_page is still pointing to the original tail, the nr_frags
parameter to xdp_update_skb_frags_info() needs to be calculated
in a different way to reflect the new nr_frags. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: RX, Fix XDP multi-buf frag counting for legacy RQ
XDP multi-buf programs can modify the layout of the XDP buffer when the
program calls bpf_xdp_pull_data() or bpf_xdp_adjust_tail(). The
referenced commit in the fixes tag corrected the assumption in the mlx5
driver that the XDP buffer layout doesn't change during a program
execution. However, this fix introduced another issue: the dropped
fragments still need to be counted on the driver side to avoid page
fragment reference counting issues.
Such issue can be observed with the
test_xdp_native_adjst_tail_shrnk_data selftest when using a payload of
3600 and shrinking by 256 bytes (an upcoming selftest patch): the last
fragment gets released by the XDP code but doesn't get tracked by the
driver. This results in a negative pp_ref_count during page release and
the following splat:
WARNING: include/net/page_pool/helpers.h:297 at mlx5e_page_release_fragmented.isra.0+0x4a/0x50 [mlx5_core], CPU#12: ip/3137
Modules linked in: [...]
CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 3137 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.19.0-rc3+ #12 NONE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_page_release_fragmented.isra.0+0x4a/0x50 [mlx5_core]
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mlx5e_dealloc_rx_wqe+0xcb/0x1a0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_free_rx_descs+0x7f/0x110 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_close_rq+0x50/0x60 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_close_queues+0x36/0x2c0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_close_channel+0x1c/0x50 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_close_channels+0x45/0x80 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_safe_switch_params+0x1a5/0x230 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_change_mtu+0xf3/0x2f0 [mlx5_core]
netif_set_mtu_ext+0xf1/0x230
do_setlink.isra.0+0x219/0x1180
rtnl_newlink+0x79f/0xb60
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x213/0x3a0
netlink_rcv_skb+0x48/0xf0
netlink_unicast+0x24a/0x350
netlink_sendmsg+0x1ee/0x410
__sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60
____sys_sendmsg+0x232/0x280
___sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0
__sys_sendmsg+0x5f/0xb0
[...]
do_syscall_64+0x57/0xc50
This patch fixes the issue by doing page frag counting on all the
original XDP buffer fragments for all relevant XDP actions (XDP_TX ,
XDP_REDIRECT and XDP_PASS). This is basically reverting to the original
counting before the commit in the fixes tag.
As frag_page is still pointing to the original tail, the nr_frags
parameter to xdp_update_skb_frags_info() needs to be calculated
in a different way to reflect the new nr_frags. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: fix nfsd_file leak on inter-server COPY setup failure
When nfsd4_setup_inter_ssc() fails, nfsd4_copy() returns
nfserr_offload_denied directly, bypassing the out: label where
release_copy_files() would drop the nf_dst reference taken by
nfs4_preprocess_stateid_op(). Each failed inter-server COPY
leaks one nfsd_file, pinning file/inode/dentry/vfsmount.
Fix by setting status and jumping to out: instead of returning
directly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: drop recovered reloc root refs on recovery failure
During relocation recovery, each fs root gets a reference to its relocation
root. If loading or adding a later root fails, or if the first transaction
commit fails, btrfs_recover_relocation() jumps to out_unset before
merge_reloc_roots() and clean_dirty_subvols().
put_reloc_control() drops the list-owned relocation root references, but it
does not clear fs_root->reloc_root or drop the references owned by those
pointers. Mount cleanup only drops them when BTRFS_FS_ERROR is set, so an
error such as -ENOMEM while processing a later root can leave references
behind.
Keep temporary references to the fs roots associated during recovery. On
failure, clear their reloc_root pointers and drop the corresponding
references. Once the first transaction commit succeeds, drop only the
temporary fs root references and let the normal merge and cleanup paths
handle the relocation roots.
Fault injection on a pending-relocation image confirmed the cleanup gap.
With an injected first-commit failure, 25 fs roots had reloc_root set with
fs_error=0. With this fix, the same failure path drops that count to 0
before mount fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: max17040: propagate register read errors
max17040_get_vcell() and max17040_get_soc() ignore errors returned by
regmap_read(). When an I2C transfer fails, the uninitialized register
value is converted and reported to userspace as a valid voltage or state
of charge. The polling worker can also replace the cached state of charge
with the bogus value and emit a spurious change event.
Propagate read errors through the power supply get_property callback and
keep the last valid cached state of charge when polling fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86/amd/pmc: Propagate SMU errors and validate S2D address
amd_stb_s2d_init() discards the return value of several S2D SMU commands.
When the SMU refuses a command (e.g. "SMU cmd failed. err: 0xff") the
failure is only noticed indirectly - if at all - and reported as -EIO,
masking the real error.
More seriously, the S2D_PHYS_ADDR_LOW/HIGH return values are ignored, so
on failure phys_addr_low/hi are left uninitialised and the assembled
address is passed straight to devm_ioremap(). When the SMU leaves them at
zero this maps physical address 0 and trips the ioremap-on-RAM warning:
amd_pmc AMDI000B:00: SMU cmd failed. err: 0xff
ioremap on RAM at 0x0000000000000000 - 0x0000000000ffffff
WARNING: CPU: 13 PID: 4592 at arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c:...
Check the return value of each SMU command and propagate it, and reject a
zero physical address before calling devm_ioremap(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: hold conn in hci_connect_acl/le_sync() callbacks
There is theoretical UAF if the conn is freed while the hci_sync task
is running.
Hold refcount to avoid that. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: use skb_header_pointer() for TCPv4 GSO frag_off check
Syzbot reported a KMSAN uninit-value warning in gso_features_check()
called from netif_skb_features() [1].
gso_features_check() reads iph->frag_off to decide whether to clear
mangleid_features. Accessing the IPv4 header via ip_hdr()/inner_ip_hdr()
can rely on skb header offsets that are not always safe for direct
dereference on packets injected from PF_PACKET paths.
Use skb_header_pointer() for the TCPv4 frag_off check so the header read
is robust whether data is already linear or needs copying.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=1543a7d954d9c6d00407 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_ecm: Fix net_device lifecycle with device_move
The net_device is allocated during function instance creation and
registered during the bind phase with the gadget device as its sysfs
parent. When the function unbinds, the parent device is destroyed, but
the net_device survives, resulting in dangling sysfs symlinks:
console:/ # ls -l /sys/class/net/usb0
lrwxrwxrwx ... /sys/class/net/usb0 ->
/sys/devices/platform/.../gadget.0/net/usb0
console:/ # ls -l /sys/devices/platform/.../gadget.0/net/usb0
ls: .../gadget.0/net/usb0: No such file or directory
Use device_move() to reparent the net_device between the gadget device
tree and /sys/devices/virtual across bind and unbind cycles. During the
final unbind, calling device_move(NULL) moves the net_device to the
virtual device tree before the gadget device is destroyed. On rebinding,
device_move() reparents the device back under the new gadget, ensuring
proper sysfs topology and power management ordering.
To maintain compatibility with legacy composite drivers (e.g., multi.c),
the bound flag is used to indicate whether the network device is shared
and pre-registered during the legacy driver's bind phase. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mmc: vub300: fix use-after-free on disconnect
The vub300 driver maintains an explicit reference count for the
controller and its driver data and the last reference can in theory be
dropped after the driver has been unbound.
This specifically means that the controller allocation must not be
device managed as that can lead to use-after-free.
Note that the lifetime is currently also incorrectly tied the parent USB
device rather than interface, which can lead to memory leaks if the
driver is unbound without its device being physically disconnected (e.g.
on probe deferral).
Fix both issues by reverting to non-managed allocation of the controller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: zero non-PI portion of auto integrity buffer
The auto-generated integrity buffer for writes needs to be fully
initialized before being passed to the underlying block device,
otherwise the uninitialized memory can be read back by userspace or
anyone with physical access to the storage device. If protection
information is generated, that portion of the integrity buffer is
already initialized. The integrity data is also zeroed if PI generation
is disabled via sysfs or the PI tuple size is 0. However, this misses
the case where PI is generated and the PI tuple size is nonzero, but the
metadata size is larger than the PI tuple. In this case, the remainder
("opaque") of the metadata is left uninitialized.
Generalize the BLK_INTEGRITY_CSUM_NONE check to cover any case when the
metadata is larger than just the PI tuple. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: avoid journaling sb update on error if journal is destroying
Presently we always BUG_ON if trying to start a transaction on a journal marked
with JBD2_UNMOUNT, since this should never happen. However, while ltp running
stress tests, it was observed that in case of some error handling paths, it is
possible for update_super_work to start a transaction after the journal is
destroyed eg:
(umount)
ext4_kill_sb
kill_block_super
generic_shutdown_super
sync_filesystem /* commits all txns */
evict_inodes
/* might start a new txn */
ext4_put_super
flush_work(&sbi->s_sb_upd_work) /* flush the workqueue */
jbd2_journal_destroy
journal_kill_thread
journal->j_flags |= JBD2_UNMOUNT;
jbd2_journal_commit_transaction
jbd2_journal_get_descriptor_buffer
jbd2_journal_bmap
ext4_journal_bmap
ext4_map_blocks
...
ext4_inode_error
ext4_handle_error
schedule_work(&sbi->s_sb_upd_work)
/* work queue kicks in */
update_super_work
jbd2_journal_start
start_this_handle
BUG_ON(journal->j_flags &
JBD2_UNMOUNT)
Hence, introduce a new mount flag to indicate journal is destroying and only do
a journaled (and deferred) update of sb if this flag is not set. Otherwise, just
fallback to an un-journaled commit.
Further, in the journal destroy path, we have the following sequence:
1. Set mount flag indicating journal is destroying
2. force a commit and wait for it
3. flush pending sb updates
This sequence is important as it ensures that, after this point, there is no sb
update that might be journaled so it is safe to update the sb outside the
journal. (To avoid race discussed in 2d01ddc86606)
Also, we don't need a similar check in ext4_grp_locked_error since it is only
called from mballoc and AFAICT it would be always valid to schedule work here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/huge_memory: avoid PMD-size page cache if needed
xarray can't support arbitrary page cache size. the largest and supported
page cache size is defined as MAX_PAGECACHE_ORDER by commit 099d90642a71
("mm/filemap: make MAX_PAGECACHE_ORDER acceptable to xarray"). However,
it's possible to have 512MB page cache in the huge memory's collapsing
path on ARM64 system whose base page size is 64KB. 512MB page cache is
breaking the limitation and a warning is raised when the xarray entry is
split as shown in the following example.
[root@dhcp-10-26-1-207 ~]# cat /proc/1/smaps | grep KernelPageSize
KernelPageSize: 64 kB
[root@dhcp-10-26-1-207 ~]# cat /tmp/test.c
:
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
const char *filename = TEST_XFS_FILENAME;
int fd = 0;
void *buf = (void *)-1, *p;
int pgsize = getpagesize();
int ret = 0;
if (pgsize != 0x10000) {
fprintf(stdout, "System with 64KB base page size is required!\n");
return -EPERM;
}
system("echo 0 > /sys/devices/virtual/bdi/253:0/read_ahead_kb");
system("echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches");
/* Open the xfs file */
fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
assert(fd > 0);
/* Create VMA */
buf = mmap(NULL, TEST_MEM_SIZE, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
assert(buf != (void *)-1);
fprintf(stdout, "mapped buffer at 0x%p\n", buf);
/* Populate VMA */
ret = madvise(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE, MADV_NOHUGEPAGE);
assert(ret == 0);
ret = madvise(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE, MADV_POPULATE_READ);
assert(ret == 0);
/* Collapse VMA */
ret = madvise(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE, MADV_HUGEPAGE);
assert(ret == 0);
ret = madvise(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE, MADV_COLLAPSE);
if (ret) {
fprintf(stdout, "Error %d to madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE)\n", errno);
goto out;
}
/* Split xarray entry. Write permission is needed */
munmap(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE);
buf = (void *)-1;
close(fd);
fd = open(filename, O_RDWR);
assert(fd > 0);
fallocate(fd, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE | FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE,
TEST_MEM_SIZE - pgsize, pgsize);
out:
if (buf != (void *)-1)
munmap(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE);
if (fd > 0)
close(fd);
return ret;
}
[root@dhcp-10-26-1-207 ~]# gcc /tmp/test.c -o /tmp/test
[root@dhcp-10-26-1-207 ~]# /tmp/test
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 25 PID: 7560 at lib/xarray.c:1025 xas_split_alloc+0xf8/0x128
Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib \
nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct \
nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 \
ip_set rfkill nf_tables nfnetlink vfat fat virtio_balloon drm fuse \
xfs libcrc32c crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce sha256_arm64 virtio_net \
sha1_ce net_failover virtio_blk virtio_console failover dimlib virtio_mmio
CPU: 25 PID: 7560 Comm: test Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-gavin+ #9
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-20240524-1.el9 05/24/2024
pstate: 83400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : xas_split_alloc+0xf8/0x128
lr : split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x1c4/0x780
sp : ffff8000ac32f660
x29: ffff8000ac32f660 x28: ffff0000e0969eb0 x27: ffff8000ac32f6c0
x26: 0000000000000c40 x25: ffff0000e0969eb0 x24: 000000000000000d
x23: ffff8000ac32f6c0 x22: ffffffdfc0700000 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffffdfc0700000 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffd5f3708ffc70 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: ffffffffffffffc0 x10: 0000000000000040 x9 : ffffd5f3708e692c
x8 : 0000000000000003 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff0000e0969eb8
x5 : ffffd5f37289e378 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000c40
x2 : 000000000000000d x1 : 000000000000000c x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
xas_split_alloc+0xf8/0x128
split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x1c4/0x780
truncate_inode_partial_folio+0xdc/0x160
truncate_inode_pages_range+0x1b4/0x4a8
truncate_pagecache_range+0x84/0xa
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: change vm->task_info handling
This patch changes the handling and lifecycle of vm->task_info object.
The major changes are:
- vm->task_info is a dynamically allocated ptr now, and its uasge is
reference counted.
- introducing two new helper funcs for task_info lifecycle management
- amdgpu_vm_get_task_info: reference counts up task_info before
returning this info
- amdgpu_vm_put_task_info: reference counts down task_info
- last put to task_info() frees task_info from the vm.
This patch also does logistical changes required for existing usage
of vm->task_info.
V2: Do not block all the prints when task_info not found (Felix)
V3: Fixed review comments from Felix
- Fix wrong indentation
- No debug message for -ENOMEM
- Add NULL check for task_info
- Do not duplicate the debug messages (ti vs no ti)
- Get first reference of task_info in vm_init(), put last
in vm_fini()
V4: Fixed review comments from Felix
- fix double reference increment in create_task_info
- change amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_pasid
- additional changes in amdgpu_gem.c while porting |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ena: Add validation for completion descriptors consistency
Validate that `first` flag is set only for the first
descriptor in multi-buffer packets.
In case of an invalid descriptor, a reset will occur.
A new reset reason for RX data corruption has been added. |
