| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Improper link resolution before file access ('link following') in Microsoft Windows Search Component allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Mattermost versions 11.9.x <= 11.9.1, 11.8.x <= 11.8.5, 11.7.x <= 11.7.10, 11.10.x <= 11.10.1 fail to sanitize authentication tokens before writing them to server log entries, which allows an attacker with access to server logs to obtain valid session tokens or OAuth access tokens and impersonate authenticated users via the debug-level Mattermost server log.. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-00763 |
| GitPython from 3.1.62 before 3.2.0 contains a symlink-following flaw in Submodule.move(), which checks the destination only lexically and does not reject symbolic links in intermediate path components. An untrusted repository can commit a symlink such as vendor pointing outside the worktree, so an application moving an initialized submodule beneath it relocates the checkout externally and corrupts the index and .gitmodules. |
| Insertion of sensitive information into log files in the git_utils[.]py component in Amazon SageMaker Python SDK V3 before 3.10.0 and V2 before 2.257.3 might allow an authenticated remote user to obtain plaintext repository credentials from CloudWatch Logs when a git clone operation fails, because the runclone_command() function does not redact credentials from subprocess error output.
To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to Amazon SageMaker Python SDK V3 3.10.0 or V2 2.257.3. |
| Rocket Software Rocket Remote Desktop 18.0.8583.1 is vulnerable to Insufficiently Protected Credentials. |
| Ludwig is a low-code framework for building custom LLMs, neural networks, and other AI models. Prior to 0.17.8, ludwig.datasets.archives.extract_archive() validated tar member names before calling TarFile.extractall() but did not validate symlink members or hard-link members. A crafted archive could create a link that escaped the extraction directory and then write a later member through that link, placing attacker-controlled content at an arbitrary filesystem path with the extracting process's privileges. The same containment check used os.path.commonprefix, so a sibling path sharing the destination's character prefix could also pass. The dataset-loading path can download and extract configured archive URLs, but exploitation requires a user to process an archive from a source controlled or compromised by the attacker on supported Python 3.12 and 3.13 runtimes. Python 3.14 is not affected because its default tar data filter rejects escaping links. This issue is fixed in version 0.17.8. |
| FileRise is a self-hosted web-based file manager with multi-file upload, editing, and batch operations. Prior to 3.23.0, FileRise validates archive entry names but extracts them directly into the authorized live destination before validating resolved paths. If that destination already contains a symlink to a directory outside the storage root, an authenticated non-administrator with extract permission who can upload or otherwise place an attacker-controlled ZIP in that folder can place an ordinary archive entry beneath the link. ZipArchive::extractTo() can then overwrite an external file, and post-extraction cleanup can delete that target through the same linked parent, only where the FileRise process has the required filesystem write or removal permission. The advisory does not establish that the attacker can create the prerequisite symlink through FileRise. This issue is fixed in version 3.23.0. |
| Improper link resolution before file access ('link following') in Windows Registry allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| A flaw was found in Nautilus. When a removable drive or disk image is unmounted or ejected, Nautilus prompts the user to empty the trash without verifying whether the trash directory paths are symbolic links. An attacker can exploit this flaw by tricking a user into mounting a crafted storage volume and confirming the prompt to empty the trash, leading to the arbitrary deletion of files accessible to that user. |
| Deserialization of untrusted data in .NET allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Deserialization of untrusted data in .NET Framework allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Improper link resolution before file access ('link following') in .NET allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Deserialization of untrusted data in .NET allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| An issue in Trisolutions BRPerfX version 1.4.4.0 exposes LDAP credentials in plaintext within the administrative configuration interface. An authenticated administrator can inspect the client-side code to retrieve the credential. |
| obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. Prior to 1.3.1, read access-control list (ACL) checks use a lexical vault-relative path while containment checks use the resolved path. An in-vault symlink under an allowed glob that resolves into a denied folder can therefore bypass the read ACL and expose files in the denied folder. Exploitation requires an out-of-band-planted symlink and does not permit an escape from the vault root. Version 1.3.1 fixes the vulnerability by applying ACL checks to the resolved vault-relative path. |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2,
2026.1.4,
2025.11.8 remote code execution via a whitelist bypass in the build messages protocol was possible |
| Deserialization of untrusted data in the Gremlin graph data import component in Amazon Neptune engine might allow an authenticated remote actor with standard database permissions to execute arbitrary code and access internal service credentials.
To remediate this issue, users not enrolled in auto-update should upgrade to Amazon Neptune engine version 1.5.0.0.(Backports to 1.4.8.1 and 1.4.7.1) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tools/power/x86/intel-speed-select: Harden daemon pidfile open
Avoid symlink-based pidfile clobbering by opening the pidfile with
O_NOFOLLOW and validating it with fstat() before locking/writing.
The daemon currently uses a fixed pidfile path under /tmp. A local
unprivileged user can pre-create a symlink at that path and cause a
root-run daemon instance to write into an attacker-chosen file. |
| Forms using FileUpload or ImageUpload elements with a custom saveToFileMount configured stored uploaded files in the default storage folder 1:/user_upload/ instead of the configured destination. This could cause uploaded files to end up in a publicly accessible storage even though a restricted, non-public storage had been configured. Files stored this way are served directly, without the access checks applied to non-public storages. Forms that use the default value for saveToFileMount are not affected. This issue affects TYPO3 CMS versions 14.0.0-14.3.8. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
landlock: Fix LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL bypass on the SIGIO path
LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL must prevent a sandboxed process from signaling
processes outside its Landlock domain. It can be bypassed through the
asynchronous SIGIO delivery path.
A sandboxed process that owns any file or socket can arm it with
fcntl(fd, F_SETOWN, -pgid), fcntl(fd, F_SETSIG, SIGKILL) and O_ASYNC, so
that an I/O event makes the kernel deliver the chosen signal to the
whole process group. As the head of its process group's task list (the
default position right after fork()) that group can also hold the
non-sandboxed process that launched it, e.g. a supervisor or a security
monitor. The sandbox can thus kill or signal the processes
LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL is meant to protect from it.
The scope is enforced in hook_file_send_sigiotask() against the Landlock
domain recorded at F_SETOWN time, not the live domain of the sender.
control_current_fowner() decides whether to record that domain and skips
recording it when the fowner target is in the caller's thread group,
which is safe only for a single-task target (PIDTYPE_PID, PIDTYPE_TGID).
For a process group (PIDTYPE_PGID) pid_task() returns only one member;
recording is skipped whenever that member shares the caller's thread
group, and hook_file_send_sigiotask() then lets the signal fan out to
the whole group unchecked.
Record the domain for every non single-process target so the scope is
enforced against each group member at delivery time.
That recording is necessary but not sufficient on its own: the kernel
signals a process group through its members' thread-group leaders, and
the leader of the registrant's own process can carry a different
Landlock domain than the sibling thread that armed the owner.
domain_is_scoped() would then deny that leader, even though commit
18eb75f3af40 ("landlock: Always allow signals between threads of the
same process") requires same-process delivery to be allowed.
hook_task_kill() avoids this by evaluating same_thread_group() live, per
recipient; the SIGIO path instead delegates the whole decision to a
single registration-time check, which a process-group fan-out cannot
honor.
So also record the registrant's thread group next to its domain and
exempt it at delivery: hook_file_send_sigiotask() allows the signal
whenever the recipient belongs to the registrant's own process,
restoring the same-process guarantee while keeping out-of-domain group
members blocked. The direct kill() path (hook_task_kill) already
evaluates the live domain and is unaffected.
[mic: Check pid_type earlier and improve comment, fix commit message,
fix comment formatting] |
